14 from within the core of the military structure in power checked the progress of the investigation, bringing it to a standstill […] [. B]esides, the argument that the paragraph referring to the judge and stating that “it is evident that a number of decisive elements that could have shed light on the murder were not taken into consideration” did not constitute defamation as the defendant was a “layman” into the investigation of the case, is groundless. In rendering this decision, the Chamber failed to take into consideration the special characteristics of malicious intent in crimes against the honor and deemed the circumstance of being a “layman” as an excuse for a crime on no grounds whatsoever. Such an absurd argument disqualifies the judgment on account of its evident arbitrariness. [… A]nother cause of arbitrariness results from the failure to consider the arguments raised by the complainant in that from the record of the case “Barbeito, Salvador et al., victims of homicide (Article 79 of the Criminal Code),” it would not only result the misrepresentation of the criminal imputation attributed to the actions of the judge, but also and particularly, the malice which, in the appellant’s opinion, was evidenced by the fact that the defendant, with the only purpose of discrediting the judge, had failed to include in the publication that the [complainant] had ignored the repeated requests for the preliminary proceedings to be discontinued filed by prosecutor Julio César Strassera[.]37 49. On March 17, 1999, the Fourth Court of the Appeals Chamber, following the criteria applied by the Supreme Court, partially ratified the condemnatory judgment rendered in the first instance regarding the penalties imposed, but instead of convicting Mr. Kimel for false imputation of a publicly actionable crime, considered that the crime of defamation had been proven.38 The Chamber pointed out that, from the arguments put forward by the Supreme Court it results that the statements made by journalist [Kimel] regarding the complainant have a malicious nature, whereby the arguments raised by the Sixth Court [of the Appeals Chamber] determining the acquittal based on the noncharacterization of the crime of defamation are groundless.39 50. Mr. Kimel submitted a motion for special review against the judgment rendered by the National Appeals Chamber to the Supreme Court,40 which was found to be inadmissible. Subsequently, the victim filed an appeal for complaint against improper dismissal of an appeal with the same Court, which was rejected in limine on September 14, 2000, thus rendering the judgment final.41 * * * 51. Regarding these facts, the arguments filed by the parties pose a collision between the right to freedom of thought and expression regarding issues of public interest and the right of public officials to have their honor respected. The Court recognizes that both freedom of thought and expression and the right to have one’s honor respected, as enshrined by the Convention, are fundamental rights. It is, therefore, imperative to ensure the exercise of both. In this regard, the prevalence of either of them in a particular case will depend on the considerations made as to proportionality. The solution to the conflict arising between some rights requires examining each case in accordance with its specific characteristics and circumstances, considering the existence of elements and the extent thereof on which the considerations regarding proportionality are to be based. 37 Cf. Judgment of December 22, 1998, rendered by the Supreme Court of Justice of Argentina (record of appendixes to the application, Volume I, Appendix 3, folios 114 to 116). 38 Cf. Judgment of March 17, 1999, rendered by the Fourth Court of the National Appeals Chamber for Criminal and Correctional Matters (record of appendixes to the application, Volume 1, Appendix 4, folio 134). 39 Cf. Judgment of March 17, 1999, supra note 38, folio 132. 40 Cf. Brief containing the motion for special review filed with the Supreme Court of Justice of Argentina (record of appendixes to the application, Volume 1, Appendix 5, folio 140). 41 Cf. Order of September 14, 2000, rendered by the Supreme Court of Justice of Argentina (record of appendixes to the application, Volume 1, Appendix 6, folio 175).