M.S.S. v. BELGIUM AND GREECE JUDGMENT – SEPARATE OPINIONS 91 CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE ROZAKIS I have voted, with the majority, to find a violation on all counts concerning Greece, and am fully in agreement with the reasoning leading to the violations. Still, I would like to further emphasise two points, already mentioned in the judgment, to which I attach particular importance. The first point concerns the Court’s reference to the considerable difficulties that States forming the European external borders are currently experiencing “in coping with the increasing influx of migrants and asylumseekers”. This statement, which is analysed and elaborated further in paragraph 223 of the judgment, correctly describes the general situation which prevails in many northern Mediterranean coastal countries. However, in the case of Greece, with its extensive northern borders but also a considerable maritime front, the migratory phenomenon has acquired a truly dramatic dimension in recent years. Statistics clearly show that the great majority of foreign immigrants – mainly of Asian origin – attempt to enter Europe through Greece, and either settle there or move on to seek a new life in other European countries. As it has already been stated, almost 88% of the immigrants (and among them asylum-seekers) entering the European Union today cross the Greek borders to land in our continent. In these circumstances, it is clear that European Union immigration policy – including the Dublin II Regulation – does not reflect the present realities, or do justice to the disproportionate burden that falls to the Greek immigration authorities. There is clearly an urgent need for a comprehensive reconsideration of the existing European legal regime, which should duly take into account the particular needs and constraints of Greece in this delicate domain of human rights protection. The second point concerns the Court’s reference to the applicant’s living conditions while in Greece, and the finding of a violation of Article 3 of the Convention. In paragraph 249 of the judgment the Court considered it necessary “to point out that Article 3 cannot be interpreted as obliging the High Contracting Parties to provide everyone within their jurisdiction with a home. ... Nor does Article 3 entail any general obligation to give refugees financial assistance to enable them to maintain a certain standard of living”. However, as the Court rightly points out, in the circumstances of the case “the obligation to provide accommodation and decent material conditions to impoverished asylum-seekers has now entered into positive law and the Greek authorities are bound to comply with their own legislation, which transposes Community law” (see paragraph 250). What the Court meant by “positive law” is duly explained in paragraph 251, where it referred to the “existence of a broad consensus at the international and European level concerning [the need for special protection of asylum-seekers as a particularly underprivileged and vulnerable population group], as evidenced by the Geneva Convention, the remit and the activities of the UNHCR