70 M.S.S. v. BELGIUM AND GREECE JUDGMENT his complaints under Articles 2 and 3, and maintained, in this context, that the remedies in question were not effective within the meaning of that provision (see paragraphs 370-77 below). It considers that the Government’s objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies should be joined to the merits of the complaints under Article 13 taken in conjunction with Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention and examined together. 337. That said, the Court considers that this part of the application cannot be rejected for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies (see paragraphs 385-96 below) and that it raises complex issues of law and fact which cannot be determined without an examination of the merits; it follows that it is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. Nor is it inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. 2. The responsibility of Belgium under the Convention 338. The Court notes the reference to the Bosphorus judgment by the Government of the Netherlands in their observations lodged as third-party interveners (see paragraph 330 above). The Court reiterated in that case that the Convention did not prevent the Contracting Parties from transferring sovereign powers to an international organisation for the purposes of cooperation in certain fields of activity (see Bosphorus, cited above, § 152). The States nevertheless remain responsible under the Convention for all actions and omissions of their bodies under their domestic law or under their international legal obligations (ibid., § 153). State action taken in compliance with such legal obligations is justified as long as the relevant organisation is considered to protect fundamental rights in a manner which can be considered at least equivalent to that for which the Convention provides. However, a State would be fully responsible under the Convention for all acts falling outside its strict international legal obligations, notably where it exercised State discretion (ibid., §§ 155-57). The Court found that the protection of fundamental rights afforded by Community law was equivalent to that provided by the Convention system (ibid., § 165). In reaching that conclusion it attached great importance to the role and powers of the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEC) – now the CJEU – in the matter, considering in practice that the effectiveness of the substantive guarantees of fundamental rights depended on the mechanisms of control set in place to ensure their observance (ibid., § 160). The Court also took care to limit the scope of the Bosphorus judgment to Community law in the strict sense – at the time the “first pillar” of European Union law (§ 72). 339. The Court notes that Article 3 § 2 of the Dublin Regulation provides that, by derogation from the general rule set forth in Article 3 § 1, each member State may examine an application for asylum lodged with it