jurisdiction an effective recourse for protection against acts that violate their fundamental rights. 309 203. As mentioned previously (supra para. 196) in the course of the preliminary inquiry SC/304/2000/VII-I, on February 10, 2001, Messrs. Cabrera and Montiel filed a brief before the PGJM, requesting that it decline jurisdiction and return the Preliminary Inquiry to the ordinary jurisdiction. However, there was no response to this petition. In this respect, the representatives alleged that “in the face of this omission” the victims “were unable to challenge the intervention by the military jurisdiction in the investigation into the torture committed against them.” The State did not deny the lack of response to the aforementioned request and did not refer to this argument. 204. In application of the abovementioned standards regarding the effectiveness of judicial remedies, and taking into account the decisions taken by the military courts, this Court concludes that Messrs. Cabrera and Montiel were unable to effectively contest the jurisdiction of the military courts to hear the matters that, due to their nature, should be heard by the ordinary judicial authorities. Consequently, Messrs. Cabrera and Montiel did not have effective remedies at their disposal to challenge the military courts’ jurisdiction over the allegations of torture. Accordingly, the Court concludes that the State violated the right to judicial protection enshrined in Article 25(1) of the American Convention, in relation to Article 1(1) thereof, to the detriment of Messrs. Cabrera and Montiel. 4. Adapting Mexican domestic law on the intervention of the military criminal courts 205. Furthermore, the Court notes that the intervention of the military courts was based on Article 57(II)(a) of the Code of Military Justice 310 (supra para. 189). In this respect, the Court reiterates that said rule: is a broad and imprecise provision that prevents the determination of the strict connection of the crime of the ordinary jurisdiction with the military jurisdiction objectively assessed. The possibility that the military courts prosecute any soldier who is accused of an ordinary crime, for the mere fact of being in service, implies that the jurisdiction is granted due to the mere circumstance of being a soldier. In that sense, even when the crime is committed by soldiers while they are still in service or based on those acts, this is not enough for them to be tried by the military criminal justice system. 311 206. In the case of Radilla Pacheco the Court considered that said provision of Article 57 operates as a rule and not as an exception, this being an essential feature of military jurisdiction for it to comply with the standards established by 309 Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Preliminary Objections, supra note 213, para. 91; Case of Fernández Ortega et al. v. Mexico, supra note 39, para. 180; and Case of Rosendo Cantú et al. v. Mexico, supra note 30, para. 164. 310 follows: Article 57. II. a) of the Code of Military Justice defines “Crimes against military discipline” as II. Common or federal crimes when any of the following circumstances attend their commission: a) The crimes were committed by military officers on active service or in connection with active service. 311 Case of Radilla Pacheco v. Mexico, supra note 302, para. 286; Case of Fernández Ortega et al. v. Mexico, supra note 39, para. 178; and Case of Rosendo Cantú et al. v. Mexico, supra note 30, para. 162. 77