the principle of presumption of innocence, 282 which is an essential element for the effective exercise of the right to defense and accompanies the defendant throughout the proceedings until the judgment determining his guilt is final. 283 184. According to the European Court, the principle of presumption of innocence implies that judges should not start a proceeding with a preconceived idea that the accused has committed the crime as charged; the burden of proof is on the prosecutor, and any doubt that arises must benefit the accused. The presumption of innocence is violated if, prior to the accused being found guilty, a judicial decision concerning him reflects the opinion that he is guilty. 284 185. In the instant case, the Court notes that, in the first stage of the proceeding against Messrs. Cabrera and Montiel, evidence challenged by the defense as being irregular and fraudulent was admitted. These questions were duly analyzed by the different courts that heard the case and, in some cases, the argument of the defense was accepted. Indeed, according to the ruling of August 14, 2002, “[the] Federal Court considered ineffective the evidence gathered by the Public Prosecutor’s Office during the preliminary inquiry regarding the crimes of possession of firearm without a permit and a crime against health in the form of cultivation of marijuana” (supra para. 73), and therefore part of the evidence challenged by the defense was not assessed in the decision to convict the victims. 186. The Court finds that there is not sufficient evidence to consider that the victims were treated as though guilty. In fact, although they were associated with a situation of flagrante delicto, in general terms, the domestic courts treated them as persons whose criminal liability was still subject to a clear and sufficient determination. Therefore, this Court considers that it has not been proven that the State violated Article 8(2) of the Convention, to the detriment of the victims, in relation to the trial conducted against them. B. Criminal proceedings to investigate the alleged torture of Messrs. Cabrera and Montiel 187. The Commission held that the military jurisdiction “was not the competent authority to investigate the facts, given that the military courts should only be used when military criminal legal interests are endangered […].” It therefore considered that the allegation of torture “exceeds any action for the defense and security [of the State],” therefore “[it] cannot be considered [as a] service-related crime and [that] the investigation into these facts should have been conducted [in] the ordinary courts.” The representatives agreed with the Commission and added that "the amparo proceeding, which by definition is the mechanism for the legal guarantee of fundamental rights in Mexico, is ineffective to contest the scope of the military jurisdiction, since it establishes very limited legal assumptions when the victims or injured parties seek to resort to the courts.” The representatives further argued that the investigation of torture was not initiated ex officio by the judicial authorities who received the complaint of the alleged facts. 188. The State pointed out that this case “is no way related to the military justice system in Mexico,” since “the alleged use of torture was assessed and determined by independent and impartial Courts belonging to the Judicial Branch of the 282 Cf. Case of Cantoral Benavides v. Peru, supra note 272, para. 121. 283 Cf. Case of Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay, supra note 279, para. 154. 284 ECHR, Case of Barberà, Messegué and Jabardo v Spain, Judgment of December 6, 1988, App. Nos. 10588/83, 10589/83, 10590/83, paras. 77 and 91. 71