pursued and exhausted in accordance with generally recognized principles of international law.” This rule compliments Article 61(2) of the same agreement, which explicitly states as a condition for action, that “[i]n order for the Court to hear a case, it is necessary that the procedures set forth in Articles 48 and 50 [be] completed” (referring to the procedure before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights). 10. The Inter-American Court does not have the jurisdiction to become a “new and last resort” to settle the original disputes of the parties in a domestic proceeding. The Inter-American Court clearly understands that it cannot be otherwise. The lucid reflections of an outstanding Inter-American judge are relevant regarding this issue: 8 The Inter-American Court, which is responsible for conducting “conventionality control” based on the comparison between the action carried out and the provisions of the American Convention, cannot and should not seek –indeed, it has never done so- to become a new and last resort to hear a dispute which originated in the domestic jurisdiction. The idea that the Inter-American Court constitutes a third or fourth instance, and potentially a jurisdiction of last resort, arises from a popular conception whose reasons are understandable, but does it not apply to the Court’s jurisdiction, to the legal dispute brought before it, the parties to the respective proceedings and to the nature of international proceedings for the protection of human rights. (Underlining added) 11. From the foregoing, it is clear that the Inter-American Court shall have jurisdiction, in certain cases, to review the actions of domestic judges, including the proper exercise of “conventionality control”, provided that the analysis is based on an examination of the compatibility of domestic measures with the American Convention on Human Rights, with its additional Protocols, and with its conventional jurisprudence; this, without turning the Inter-American Court into a “court of appeals” or court of “fourth instance,” because its actions are limited to the analysis of certain violations of the international commitments made by the respondent State in each particular case, and not of each and every one of the actions of domestic judicial bodies, which obviously in this latter case would mean substituting the domestic jurisdiction, violating the very essence of the reinforcing and complementary nature of the international courts. 12. On the contrary, the Inter-American Court has jurisdiction to hear “matters related to the compliance with the commitments made by State Parties”; 9 the main purpose of the Inter-American Court’s is precisely “the application and interpretation of the American Convention on Human Rights,” 10 from which it also derives its jurisdiction to analyze the proper exercise of “conventionality control” by a domestic judge when there are violations of the Pact of San Jose. This analysis shall necessarily be undertaken by the conventional judge when deciding on the “merits” of the matter and not as a “preliminary objection,” this being the moment when domestic actions are subjected to an “examination of conventionality” in light of the American Convention, along with their interpretation by the Inter-American Court. 8 Para. 3 of the Concurring Opinion of Judge Sergio García Ramírez in relation to the Judgment in the Case of Vargas Areco v. Paraguay. Merits, Reparations and Costs, of September 26, 2006. Series C No. 155. 9 Article 33 of the American Convention on Human Rights. 10 Article 1 of the Statute of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights. 4