general principle of law, is unfounded. It maintains that it applies to any international dispute settlement system. 358. It further contends that, in this respect, lis pendens also covers proceedings before other regional human rights bodies and is, therefore, applicable before this Court. 359. Furthermore, the Respondent State argues that, contrary to the submission by the Applicant State, the instant case and the one pending before the EACJ are similar. It argues that the cases have the same subject, namely, the alleged violations of human rights, and subsequently, the promotion and protection of human and peoples’ rights, in accordance with the provisions of the Charter. Moreover, it concerns the same parties. It observes that the assertion that the Court and the EACJ have different mandates is irrelevant, since lis pendens is analysed in relation to the identity of the parties, the similarity of the interest in bringing the action and the remedies sought. The Respondent State considers that this criterion is met given that the EACJ proceedings and the instant proceedings concern the same parties, have the same cause of action and the same reliefs sought. 360. At the hearing, the Respondent State reiterated the content of its submissions. It added that the EACJ's jurisdiction to interpret and apply the EAC treaty does not preclude it from hearing human rights issues relating to the said treaty and subsequent claims for reparation as, in its view, it emerges from prolific EACJ jurisprudence. In this respect, it cites the matter of Katabazi and Parti Démocratique v. the Secretary General of the East African Community and four others. *** 361. The Court notes that it emerges from Article 56(7) of the Charter, restated in Rule 50(2)(g) of the Rules, that on the pain of being declared inadmissible, applications submitted to it must not concern cases which have been settled by the States concerned in accordance with the principles 80