the instant case. It follows, in its view, that even if this obligation did exist, it would not be subject to it. 221. At the hearing, the Applicant State reiterated the content of its submissions. It also argued that it could not be faulted for having duly referred a matter to a court of competent jurisdiction if it has not been established that this referral was for purposes other than those for which the said court was established. 222. It further submitted that it referred the matter to this Court in accordance with its enabling procedural framework, and that the present proceedings cannot be declared abusive in the absence of any evidence of manifest bad faith. 223. Lastly, the Applicant State asserts that, in any event, under the Court’s jurisprudence, in particular XYZ v. Republic of Benin, abuse of the right to institute proceedings cannot be dealt with at the admissibility stage, but rather after examination of the merits of the case. * 224. In its Response, the Respondent State reiterates its arguments in support of the objection. 225. In addition, with regard to the Applicant State’s argument as to the criteria for classifying an application as an abuse of process, the Respondent State argues that frivolity or bad faith are not the only such criteria. It notes, however, that the phrase ‘inter alia’ used in XYZ v. Republic of Benin clearly indicates that, for the Court, abuse of process is determined on a case-bycase basis and may result from a number of circumstances such as instances of deliberate parallel proceedings. 226. The Respondent State contends that the case before the EACJ and the instant Application are substantially similar in terms of their circumstances, 52