26 MAKARATZIS v. GREECE JUDGMENT examined complaints under this provision where the alleged victim had not died as a result of the impugned conduct. 50. In this connection, it may be observed, on the one hand, that the Court has already recognised that there may be a positive obligation on the State under the first sentence of Article 2 § 1 to protect the life of the individual from third parties or from the risk of life-endangering illness (see Osman v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 28 October 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-VIII, pp. 3159-63, §§ 115-22; Yaşa v. Turkey, judgment of 2 September 1998, Reports 1998-VI, pp. 2436-41, §§ 92-108; and L.C.B. v. the United Kingdom, judgment of 9 June 1998, Reports 1998-III, pp. 1403-04, §§ 36-41). 51. On the other hand, the case-law establishes that it is only in exceptional circumstances that physical ill-treatment by State agents which does not result in death may disclose a violation of Article 2 of the Convention. It is correct that in the proceedings brought under the Convention the criminal responsibility of those concerned in the use of the impugned force is not in issue. Nonetheless, the degree and type of force used and the intention or aim behind the use of force may, among other factors, be relevant in assessing whether in a particular case the State agents’ actions in inflicting injury short of death are such as to bring the facts within the scope of the safeguard afforded by Article 2 of the Convention, having regard to the object and purpose pursued by that Article. In almost all cases where a person is assaulted or ill-treated by the police or soldiers, their complaints will rather fall to be examined under Article 3 of the Convention (see İlhan, cited above, § 76). 52. What the Court must therefore determine in the present case, where State agents were implicated in the applicant’s wounding, is whether the force used against him was potentially lethal and what kind of impact the conduct of the officials concerned had not only on his physical integrity but also on the interest the right to life is intended to protect. 53. It is common ground that the applicant was chased by a large number of police officers who made repeated use of revolvers, pistols and submachine guns. It is clear from the evidence adduced before the Court that the police used their weapons in order to stop the applicant’s car and effect his arrest, this being one of the instances contemplated by the second paragraph of Article 2 when the resort to lethal, or potentially lethal, force may be legitimate. As far as the ill-treatment proscribed by Article 3 is concerned, at no time could there be inferred from the police officers’ conduct an intention to inflict pain, suffering, humiliation or debasement on him (see, as a recent authority, Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and Russia [GC], no. 48787/99, §§ 425-28, ECHR 2004-VII). In particular, on the material before it the Court cannot find that the applicant’s allegation as to the