State responsibility ply”.810 The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia protested these measures as “unlawful, unilateral and an example of the policy of discrimination”.811 (4) In some other cases, certain States similarly suspended treaty rights in order to exercise pressure on States violating collective obligations. However, they did not rely on a right to take countermeasures, but asserted a right to suspend the treaty because of a fundamental change of circumstances. Two examples may be given: • Netherlands-Suriname (1982). In 1980, a military Government seized power in Suriname. In response to a crackdown by the new Government on opposition movements in December 1982, the Dutch Government suspended a bilateral treaty on development assistance under which Suriname was entitled to financial subsidies.812 While the treaty itself did not contain any suspension or termination clauses, the Dutch Government stated that the human rights violations in Suriname constituted a fundamental change of circumstances which gave rise to a right of suspension.813 • European Community member States-the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1991). In the autumn of 1991, in response to resumption of fighting within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, European Community members suspended and later denounced the 1983 Cooperation Agreement with Yugoslavia.814 This led to a general repeal of trade preferences on imports and thus went beyond the weapons embargo ordered by the Security Council in resolution 713 (1991) of 25 September 1991. The reaction was incompatible with the terms of the Cooperation Agreement, which did not provide for the immediate suspension but only for denunciation upon six months’ notice. Justifying the suspension, European Community member States explicitly mentioned the threat to peace and security in the region. But as in the case of Suriname, they relied on fundamental change of circumstances, rather than asserting a right to take countermeasures.815 (5) In some cases, there has been an apparent willingness on the part of some States to respond to violations of obligations involving some general interest, where those 810 BYBIL, 1998, vol. 69, p. 581; see also BYBIL, 1999, vol. 70, pp. 555–556. 811 Statement of the Government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia on the suspension of flights of Yugoslav Airlines of 10 October 1998. See M. Weller, The Crisis in Kosovo 1989-1999 (Cambridge, Documents & Analysis Publishing, 1999), p. 227. 812 Tractatenblad van het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, No. 140 (1975). See H.-H. Lindemann, “The repercussions resulting from the violation of human rights in Surinam on the contractual relations between the Netherlands and Surinam”, Zeitschrift für ausländisches öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht, vol. 44 (1984), p. 64, at pp. 68–69. 813 R. C. R. Siekmann, “Netherlands State practice for the parliamentary year 1982–1983”, NYIL, 1984, vol. 15, p. 321. 814 Official Journal of the European Communities, No. L 41 of 14 February 1983, p. 1; No. L 315 of 15 November 1991, p. 1, for the suspension; and No. L 325 of 27 November 1991, p. 23, for the denunciation. 815 See also the decision of the European Court of Justice in A. Racke GmbH and Co. v. Hauptzollamt Mainz, case C-162/96, Reports of cases before the Court of Justice and the Court of First Instance, 1998-6, p. I–3655, at pp. 3706–3708, paras. 53–59. 139 States could not be considered “injured States” in the sense of article 42. It should be noted that in those cases where there was, identifiably, a State primarily injured by the breach in question, other States have acted at the request and on behalf of that State.816 (6) As this review demonstrates, the current state of international law on countermeasures taken in the general or collective interest is uncertain. State practice is sparse and involves a limited number of States. At present, there appears to be no clearly recognized entitlement of States referred to in article 48 to take countermeasures in the collective interest. Consequently, it is not appropriate to include in the present articles a provision concerning the question whether other States, identified in article 48, are permitted to take countermeasures in order to induce a responsible State to comply with its obligations. Instead, chapter II includes a saving clause which reserves the position and leaves the resolution of the matter to the further development of international law. (7) Article 54 accordingly provides that the chapter on countermeasures does not prejudice the right of any State, entitled under article 48, paragraph 1, to invoke the responsibility of another State, to take lawful measures against the responsible State to ensure cessation of the breach and reparation in the interest of the injured State or the beneficiaries of the obligation breached. The article speaks of “lawful measures” rather than “countermeasures” so as not to prejudice any position concerning measures taken by States other than the injured State in response to breaches of obligations for the protection of the collective interest or those owed to the international community as a whole. Part Four GENERAL PROVISIONS This Part contains a number of general provisions applicable to the articles as a whole, specifying either their scope or certain matters not dealt with. First, article 55 makes it clear by reference to the lex specialis principle that the articles have a residual character. Where some matter otherwise dealt with in the articles is governed by a special rule of international law, the latter will prevail to the extent of any inconsistency. Correlatively, article 56 makes it clear that the articles are not exhaustive, and that they do not affect other applicable rules of international law on matters not dealt with. There follow three saving clauses. Article 57 excludes from the scope of the articles questions concerning the responsibility of international organizations and of States for the acts of international organizations. The articles are without prejudice to any question of the individual responsibility under international law of any person acting on behalf of a State, and this is made clear by article 58. Finally, article 59 reserves the effects of the Charter of the United Nations itself. 816 Cf. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (footnote 36 above) where ICJ noted that action by way of collective selfdefence could not be taken by a third State except at the request of the State subjected to the armed attack (p. 105, para. 199).