the means employed to achieve the objective or the justification.67 For any defence of the State to be justified, the differential treatment should be absolutely necessary to achieve what has been raised as an objective.68 Therefore, this begs the question as to whether the differential treatment of pregnant and married girls in school policies and practices is absolutely necessary to achieve the deterrence of sexual relations among children as argued by the Respondent State. A restriction on a right is said to be absolutely necessary if there is no other alternative to achieve the intended objective and if the measure taken is the least restrictive compared to the other available options.69 The Committee notes that the expulsion of and denial of re-entry of pregnant and married girls in school is by no means a necessary measure to deter sexual relationships among adolescents. It is a clear contradiction with article 11(6) of the Charter. The Committee, in the Minority Rights Group International and other v Mauritania case, has pronounced that any differential treatment based on a ground that is prohibited by the Charter is a violation of article 3.70 Moreover, the Committee notes that most cases of teenage pregnancy and child marriage are a result of deeprooted gender-based violence against children. Children who are married should be treated as victims of systemic gender-based discrimination or other factors that result in child marriage. The Committee also acknowledges that systemic discrimination embraces both intentional and effects-based discrimination, and acknowledges the individual and collective, institutional and structural dimensions of discrimination that inculcate unfair treatment, exclusion of individuals because of their status, and differential treatment, based on their sex, age, race, national or ethnic origin, or religion.71 55. Children who fall pregnant while in school are also girls who need the support of the State. However, the Committee is mindful that most teenage pregnancies are a result of complex socio-economic factors that need to be addressed. The Committee, in its decision on the IHRDA and other v Cameroon case, stated that ’the social subordination of women that is causing and sustaining gender-based violence is by itself gender-based discrimination of women’.72 The act of the Respondent State whereby it is expelling pregnant and married girls perpetuates such negative and discriminatory attitudes which result in child marriage and teenage pregnancy. Furthermore, it affirms the societal attitude that discriminates and stigmatises pregnant girls. The Respondent State can resort to various measures to prevent teenage pregnancy and marriage among schoolgirls. The Committee strongly asserts that the adoption of such measures is required from the State as part of its obligation under the Charter. The Committee would also like to highlight that the prevention of 67 ACHPR, Comm. No. 313/05 (2010), Kenneth Good v. Republic of Botswana, para 219. 68 ACHPR, Comm. No 211/98, Legal Resources Foundation v Zambia, para 67. 69 Ms. X v. Argentina, Case 10.506, Report No. 38/96, Inter-Am.C.H.R., OEA/Ser.L/V/II.95 Doc. 7 rev. at 50 (1997) para 73-75; Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism (Article 13 and 29 American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-5/85 of November 13, 1985. Series A No. 5, para 46. 70 ACERWC, Communication No 007/com/003/2015, Minority Rights Group International and SOSEsclaves v the Republic of Mauritania, 2017, para 61. 71 Sheppard, C. (2009). Systemic Discrimination and Gender Inequality in P Mendes, E., Srighanthan, S., & Mendes, E. P. (2009). Confronting discrimination and inequality in China: Chinese and Canadian perspectives (p. 233). 72 ACERWC, Communication No. 006/com/002/2015, Institute of Human Rights and Development in Africa and Finders Groups Initiatives on behalf of TFA v The Republic of Cameroon, 2018, para 61. JN 24