12 CENBAUER v. CROATIA JUDGMENT minimum level of severity is relative; it depends on all the circumstances of the case, such as the duration of the treatment, its physical and mental effects and, in some cases, the sex, age and state of health of the victim. Furthermore, in considering whether treatment is “degrading” within the meaning of Article 3, the Court will have regard to whether its object is to humiliate and debase the person concerned and whether, as far as the consequences are concerned, it adversely affected his or her personality in a manner incompatible with Article 3. However, the absence of such a purpose cannot conclusively rule out a finding of a violation of this provision (see Peers, cited above, §§ 67-68, and Valašinas v. Lithuania, no. 44558/98, § 101, ECHR 2001-VIII). 44. The Court has consistently stressed that the suffering and humiliation involved must in any event go beyond that inevitable element of suffering or humiliation connected with a given form of legitimate treatment or punishment. Measures depriving a person of his liberty may often involve such an element. Under Article 3 the State must ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for his human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure do not subject him to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, his health and well-being are adequately secured (see Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, §§ 92-94, ECHR 2000-XI). 45. The Court notes that in the present case the parties have disputed certain circumstances pertaining to the general conditions of detention at LSP. However, the Court considers that, even so, it can make its assessment of the case relying on the parties' submissions, the findings of the CPT and the Court's delegation outlined above (see paragraphs 21 and 22 above). 46. It is undisputed that the applicant was housed in B wing from 3 January 2001, shortly after he was admitted to LSP for the third time, until 8 April 2003, when he was transferred to the renovated part of the prison. During that time he shared a cell measuring 5.6 m² with another inmate, in other words, he was afforded 2.8 m² of space. During a period of two months he was alone in the cell. Although this space was not as small as in some other cases the Court has examined in the past (see, for example, Kalashnikov v. Russia, no. 47095/99, § 97, ECHR 2002-VI), it must be noted that the space was smaller than 4 m², which is the minimum requirement for a single inmate in multi-occupancy cells under both the domestic law and the CPT standards (see, for example, the CPT report on its visit to Latvia in 2002 – CPT/Inf (2005) 8, § 65). 47. The Government claimed that the applicant himself had been partly responsible for being placed in B wing, because he had stated that he did not want to work. The applicant did not deny this fact. The Court does not accept the Government's argument that conditions of imprisonment could be determined according to whether an inmate was working or not, since all