O’HALLORAN AND FRANCIS v. THE UNITED KINGDOM JUDGMENT 23 DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE PAVLOVSCHI The case before us is both interesting from a legal point of view and important for the cause of human rights protection. This case is not just about police cameras and speed traps, it is about much more important issues such as the fundamental principles governing modern criminal procedure and the basic elements of the notion of a fair trial. In its judicial practice this Court has already had a chance to examine some aspects of the prohibition of compulsory self-incrimination and the presumption of innocence as they exist in different European States, and also to express its vision on what is and is not acceptable in this field in a democratic society and in the circumstances of our daily lives. The circumstances of the present case give us a further opportunity to examine these rather difficult questions. The applicants’ cars were photographed by police speed cameras at a speed trap, whereupon the applicants received a Notice of Intended Prosecution which informed them that proceedings were to be instituted against them as actual or potential defendants in connection with a specified road-traffic offence for which the police had technical and photographic evidence. In accordance with section 172 of the Road Traffic Act 1988 the applicants were asked in each case – as registered keepers of the vehicles in question, which had been photographed – who had been the driver of the car on the occasion in question. Failure to comply with this statutory request constitutes a criminal offence. Under the threat of criminal prosecution, Mr O’Halloran informed the police that he had been the driver, and was fined for speeding. His attempts to have the evidence excluded were unsuccessful. Mr Francis, on being required to furnish the name and address of the driver of his car, refused to do so, relying on his right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination, and was fined for failure to supply the information. The penalties for the substantive offence and for failure to supply the information are similar. The applicants claimed that their right not to incriminate themselves was violated – either because they gave the information under threat of a fine, and were convicted on the strength of that confession, or because they were convicted for refusing to give self-incriminating information. They alleged a violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and 2. In my opinion there are some issues of crucial importance to understanding and correctly adjudicating the present case. Allow me here to repeat the words of Judge Walsh in his concurring opinion in Saunders v. the United Kingdom (17 December 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-VI): “It is important to bear in mind that this case does not