of the date for the hearing, and that, among others, the dismissal was contrary to natural justice denying her right to equitable share of the matrimonial property. She maintained that it was her counselâs fault that resulted in her present situation and that should anyone be punished, it should have been her counsel not her. She further advocated that the decision by the High Court did not determine her marital status or the partition of matrimonial property, including child custodial issues. It merely disposed of the matter on the superficial reason that procedure had not been complied with. 37. The Respondent State, on the other hand, insisted that it shall not be held responsible for the Complainantâs failure to follow procedure in enforcing her rights. It even suggested that the Complainant rather proceed against her own counsel for failure to appear which resulted in the dismissal of the case by the High Court. 38. The African Commission notes that civil procedure concerns itself with enabling parties enforce their substantive rights before the courts as guaranteed by substantive laws. It is not disputed that the present Complainant failed to do so by failing to appear on the date for hearing of the matter. What is disputed is the fairness of the dismissal of the matter in its entirety, which the Respondent State claimed was proper. 39. The Respondent State claimed that the High Courtâs decision based itself on Order IX Rule 8 of the countryâs Civil Procedure Code of 1966, which read: âWhere the defendant appears and the plaintiff does not appear when the suit is called on for hearing, the court shall make an order that the suit be dismissed unless the defendant admits the claim, or part thereof, in which case the court shall pass a decree against the defendant upon such admission, and, where part only of the claim has been admitted, shall dismiss the suit so far as it relates to the remainder.â 40. The subsequent Rule 9 (1) under the same Order IX, however, introduced an important exception to Rule 8 above in providing the plaintiff an opportunity to have the dismissal set aside. It states that the plaintiff: â ... may apply for an order to set the dismissal aside, and if he satisfies the court that there was sufficient cause for his non-appearance when the suit was called on for hearing, the court shall make an order setting aside the dismissal... , and shall appoint a day for proceeding the suit.â 41. The African Commission does not wish to pre-empt the understanding and interpretation of these rules by Tanzanian courts. Yet, the combined reading of these two Rules clearly shows that the dismissal of the suit by the High Court is not unassailable and that as long as the plaintiff can show sufficient cause for her non-appearance, the court should allow the Complainant to proceed with the suit. The High Court may exercise discretion, on a case by case basis, in deciding whether the cause shown before it to have the dismissal set aside is sufficient or not. 42. The Courts are provided with further discretionary power under Order XXXIX Rule 11 (2) of the same procedure code when they decide upon the appeals before them. This Rule reads: âIf on the day fixed or any other day to which the hearing may be adjourned the appellant does not appear when the appeal is called on for hearing, the court may make an order that the appeal be dismissed.â 43. The emphasis here is on âmay make an order that the appeal be dismissedâ. This is a clear discretion left to the court to decide as it deemed fit. Again, the African Commission does not wish to delve into the interpretation of this or any other laws of Tanzania. Yet, the effect of their application, should it run contrary to the natural justice principle underlying Article 7.1.a of the African Charter, can be a proper subject before the African Commission. 44. The facts as presented by the parties and not contested indicate that there were no proceedings held justifying the closure of the Complainantâs case without further hearings. In such circumstances, the African Commission cannot but agree with the Complainantâs claim that the option the court followed in dismissing her appeal without giving her an opportunity to be heard and without considering the consequences that may have on her claims to property and child custody (which could have been taken care of by a favourable exercise of discretion by the courts) does not conform with the requirements of the African Charter and the principle of natural justice. The courtâs decision to simply dismiss the Complainantâs petition ushered in uncertainty as to the status of the marriage itself, the partition of patrimonial property, and custodial issues. 45. The African Commission holds that substantive rights enshrined in the African Charter rely on procedural rules for their effective enjoyment. The application of these procedural rules giving effect to the enjoyment these rights should be checked since, like in the present case, their application may negate the very substantive rights, resulting in their curtailment or deprivation. Member States have committed themselves to give effect to rights contained in the African Charter. The African Commission holds that the application of these procedures domestically put in place with a view to implement the African Charter should not result in frustrating the very obligations the Member States undertook in committing themselves 4