"psychological torture." The absolute prohibition of torture, in all its forms, is now part of international jus cogens. 93. Likewise, the Court considers that, according to the circumstances of each particular case, some acts of aggression inflicted on a person may be classified as mental torture, particularly acts that have been prepared and carried out deliberately against the victim to eliminate his mental resistance and force him to accuse himself of or confess to certain criminal conducts, or to subject him to other punishments, in addition to the deprivation offreedom itself 94. In the case sub judice, it has been proved that Maritza Urrutia was subjected to acts of mental violence by being exposed intentionally to a context of intense suffering and anguish, according to the practice that prevailed at that time,33 92. The Commission turns to consider whether the fads presented by the Complainant establish a situation of psychological torture. The Commission has held that complainants before it bear the initial onus qf laying a fact~al foundation in support of their allegations especially, allegation,s ~f torture under Article 5, which it has found must be substantiated by the persons making them. 34 93. The Commission notes that the Complainant has not presented a factual pattern corroborated by cogent evidence which demonstrate torture with the meaning of Article 5 of the Charter as read with Article 1 of the CAT. The Commission enjoins complainants to , "make precise ~llegations of facts by attaching relevant documents, if possible, and avoid making allegations in general terms." 35 Despite the Commission's decip.edly lower threshold in which torture is defined as widely as possible, the complainant's case stiU fails. 94. In the present case, the Complainant has only claimed experiencing "psychological torture" arising from the election of Mr. Francis Kaparo as Speaker of Parliament on the 9th of January 2003 and the subsequent confirmations made by the Courts to this effect. From a reading of the Complainant's arguments on the merits, the Commission cannot pick out any evidence of the Complainant's psychological pain or suffering intentionally inflicted by the State or its officials. Moreover, the Commission does not consider the facts relied on by the Complainant to amount to an attack on his inherent human dignity and the recognition of his status as a person. Accordingly, the Commission is not convinced that the Complainant's right to freedom from torture was violated.