attachment and sale of the debtor's goods in a civil matter vests in the courts of the land. Section 38 (2), however, limits the debtor's rights in section 34 by vesting that authority in the Bank. The Bank itself decides whether it has an enforceable claim against the debtor; the Bank itself decides the outcome of the dispute and the subsequent relief; and the Bank itself enforces its own discretion, thereby usurping the powers and functions of the courts" (the underlining is ours) - vide paragraph 20. Moreover, in Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC), the Constitutional Court of South Africa stated at paragraphs 34 and 52 respectively as follows:(1) "Courts have long held that a term in a contract that deprives a party of the right to seek judicial redress is contrary to public policy." (2) ". . . the requirement of an adequate and fair opportunity to seek judicial redress is consistent with the notions of fairness and justice which inform public policy." It is our considered opinion that section 38(2) of the Act and section 16(7)(d) of the Constitution of the Respondent, by preventing access to the courts, also breaches principles of international law, in the light of the various authorities quoted by us in the Mike Campbell v The Republic of Zimbabwe case, cited already. 4. Breach of the Rules of Natural Justice As held in the Mike Campbell v The Republic of Zimbabwe case, quoted above, 'the right to a fair hearing before an individual is deprived of a right, interest or legitimate expectation is another principle well recognized and embodied in law'. We can only restate what Lord Diplock for the Board of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council stated in Attorney-General of the Commonwealth of the Bahamas v Ryan (1980) A.C. 718:"It has long been settled law that a decision affecting the legal rights of an individual which is arrived at by a procedure which offends against the principles of natural justice is outside the jurisdiction of the decision-making authority." It is noteworthy that, in the present case, ABZ had acted against the principles of natural justice in that the Applicant was not only denied the right of a hearing before an independent and impartial court or tribunal where he could contest the amount of the debt allegedly owed by him and the value of his farm which he claimed had been sold by ABZ at little more than half of its actual price, but that ABZ also became a judge in its own cause. It is significant that no argument whatsoever was advanced by learned Agent for the Respondent in respect of the issue as to whether the Applicant has been denied access to the courts and deprived of a fair hearing before his property was seized and sold at auction by ABZ under the Act, in breach of Articles 4(c) and 6(1) of the Treaty. Counsel simply contented himself with observing that he would not at this stage, as he put it, "respond to the legal issues" presented on behalf of the Applicant since he considered that those issues should first be raised in the Supreme Court of the Respondent before they were dealt with by the Tribunal. The only argument made on behalf of ABZ was in the affidavit of its representative which was to the effect that the seizure and sale of the Applicant's immovable property was analogous to the common law rights of a pledge. The short answer to this argument is, as rightly pointed out by learned Agent for the Applicant, that a pledge applies to a movable thing and not to immovable property which is subject to a mortgage, as is the case with the immoveable property of the Applicant. We consequently hold that the Applicant has been denied access to the courts and deprived of a fair hearing, in contravention of Articles 4(c) and 6(1) of the Treaty, when his mortgaged property was seized and sold by ABZ under section 38(2) of the Act, and that the sale was illegal and void since both section 38(2) of the Act and section 16(7)(d) of the Constitution of the Respondent, which sanctions that provision of the Act , contravene Articles 4(c) and 6(1) of the Treaty. 7