REASONED CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE SERGIO GARCÍA RAMÍREZ TO THE JUDGMENT IN THE MARITZA URRUTIA CASE, OF NOVEMBER 27, 2003 1. In the judgment on merits and reparations in this case, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights has examined some relevant issues that it also considered in the judgment in the Mack Chang case, delivered on November 26, 2003. This is particularly true with regard to the State’s acknowledgement of institutional or international responsibility in relation to certain facts or specific claims set out in the Inter-American Commission’s application. In the case in point, the State acknowledged its institutional responsibility with regard to the violation of Article 1(1) of the American Convention, without, at the same time, making any express acknowledgement concerning the facts, the “occurrence” of which it was accepting. 2. I do not consider it necessary to examine in detail the arguments and the scope of the acknowledgement of responsibility made by the State in this concurring reasoned opinion. It would be difficult to accept responsibility for the violation of Article 1(1), referring to the general obligation to respect and ensure the exercise of the rights and obligations established in the American Convention and, at the same time, admit “that the facts had occurred,” without extending this acknowledgement to the nature and characteristics of such facts, from which the so-called institutional responsibility arises. It would appear that the State was only referring to the general function of protection that is incumbent on a State with regard to all persons subject to its jurisdiction, without taking into account the other concurrent elements in this specific case. If this is so, the ultimate consequence would be the acknowledgement of institutional responsibility for any facts, without distinguishing their source, that affect persons or property subject to the protection of the State in the terms of the American Convention. 3. In any case, we are again faced with the problem that arises from the acknowledgement by the defendant State of facts, claims and/or responsibilities, when that State does not fully identify itself with a plain acceptance of the facts and an acquiescence to the claims that the conclusion of the case on merits and the transfer to the reparations stage may involve, if the international court considers it pertinent. In the instant case, the Court had to evaluate the scope of the State’s acknowledgement, as it did more extensively in the judgment in the Mack Chang case. Therefore, I refer to what I stated in my concurring reasoned opinion to the judgment in that case. 4. I consider that it is important to emphasize the Court’s analysis of the treatment inflicted on Maritza Urrutia by State agents, who violated her right to physical and moral integrity, protected by Article 5 of the Convention. This treatment amounted to torture in the terms of this Article. Consequently, there was a violation of both the Pact of San José and Articles 1 and 6 of the Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish Torture. In its respective considerations, which I fully endorse, the Court emphasized that the prohibition of torture encompasses all possible forms of torture, and that this absolute prohibition forms part of international jus cogens. 5. I believe that it is important that the Court has rejected emphatically any form of torture, and also the alleged explanation of torture – it cannot be called justification – arising from the need to combat some of the most serious types of