166 Trial Chamber in the relevant Decision of 27 November 1996. In the first paragraph of the separate opinion which he appended to that Decision, Judge Vohrah said, "I fully agree with the views expressed by my brother Judge Stephen, for the reasons he has given". In the second paragraph of hisown separate opinion, Judge Stephen said: The witness statement had not been in any way referred to in the witness' evidence in chief nor had anything emerged in cross-examination regarding it other than that, in answer to a question about what the witness had said when he made that statement, which was objected to by Defence counsel but was allowed, the witness said that he had “talked about, how can I put it, the truth and only the truth, how long I have known Du{ko Tadi}”. Clearly, the defence had not sought in any way to place reliance on the particular defence witness statement. Thus,the conclusion reached by the majority that defence witness statements were not accessible to the prosecution was not intended to apply where a defence witness statement had been in some way referred to in the evidence-inchief of the witness or otherwise relied upon by the defence . The situation with which the majority was dealing was one in which what was being asserted by the prosecution was an unqualified right to see a defence witness statement provided only that the witness had given evidence-in-chief –even if the statement was not referred to in that evidence. It is not so clear to me that the majority intended to deny that special circumstances could warrant disclosure. 54. There is one other matter. The parties were agreed that nothing in the reliefs prayed for by either side turned on a determination of the above-mentioned point. They were nevertheless also agreed that the importance of the point justif ied a pronouncement by the Appeals Chamber. The position was similar in respect of the issue whether discriminatory intent has to be proved in respect of all crimes against humanity under Article 5 of the Statute. 55. Were the parties right in the position which they took? I think they were. The principle is conveniently stated thus: Appellate courts determine only matters actually before them on appeal, and no others, and will not give opinions on controversies or declare principles of law which cannot have any practical effect in settling the rights of the litigants. They consider only those questions that are necessary for the decision of the case and do not attempt further 'to lay down "a rule of guidance or precedent to the bench and bar of the state"'. Questions not directly involved in an appeal, or not necessary or relevant to, or material in, the final determination of the cause, will not be considered or decided by an appellate court, unless, it has been held, they are affected with a public interest