153 affairs of Nicaragua. Then, in paragraph 292(4), it held that the United States, "by those acts of intervention referred to in subparagraph (3) hereof which involve the use of force, has acted, against the Republic of Nicaragua, in breach of its obligation under customary international law not to use force against another State". The acts of intervention which involved a use of force included the arming and training of the contras, the Court having explicitly held that "the arming and training of the contras can certainly be said to involve the threat or use of force against Nicaragua". 11. This is consistent with the Court's statement, in paragraph 238 of its judgement, that the United States, having no legal right to use force in the circumstances of the case, "has violated the principle prohibiting recourse to the threat or use of force ... by its assistance to the contras to the extent that this assistance 'involve[s] a threat or use of force' (paragraph 228 above)". Paragraph 228, to which the Court referred, is set out in relevant part above. 12. The contras were not using force exclusively on behalf of the United States; the case makes it clear that they were also using force on their own behalf against the Government of Nicaragua. This must be borne in mind in considering the following statement of the Court: The conflict between the contras’ forces and those of the Government of Nicaragua is an armed conflict which is ‘not of an international character’. The acts of the contras towards the Nicaraguan Government are therefore governed by the law applicable to conflicts of that character; whereas the actions of the United States in and against Nicaragua fall under the legal rules relating to international conflicts. (Ibid., p.114, para.219). I do not think anything in this passage is opposed to the conclusion that the United States was using force through the contras against the Government of Nicaragua, a finding which the Court in fact made as, I think, the Appeals Chamber in this case recognises (see para. 130 of the judgement). To judge whether that finding is applicable here, it is necessary to consider the facts of this case. 13. The Trial Chamber accepted that, having been itself in direct armed conflict with BH through the Yugoslav People's Army ("JNA"), the FRY established the VRS, trained it, equipped it, supplied it and maintained it. The establishment was done by the FRY, on 19 May 1992, by leaving in BH part of the JNA to function as the VRS, and doing that just days after the Security Council had called on the FRY to withdraw from BH. Senior military officers from the FRY were members of the staff of the VRS. The FRY paid the salaries (and pensions after retirement) of officers of the VRS who came over from the JNA. The headquarters of the VRS had a link with the headquarters of the