38. The Respondent State finally avers that the African Charter does not prescribe how States Parties should achieve the protection of the rights enshrined within the domestic jurisdiction, but leaves the way in which such protection is to be achieved to the discretion of States Parties. 39. The African Commission has examined the complaint and the various documents thereto and decides as follows: Merits Violation of the right to freedom of religion: Article 8 of the African Charter 40. The Complainant alleges violation of this Article due to the Respondent State's alleged proscription of the sacramental use of cannabis and for failure to provide a religious exemption for Rastafari. The crux of his argument is that manifestation of Rastafari religious belief, which involves the sacramental use of cannabis, places the Rastafari in conflict with the law and puts them at risk of arrest, prosecution and conviction for the offence of possession or use of cannabis. While admitting the prohibition serves a rational and legitimate purpose, he nonetheless holds that this prohibition is disproportionate as it included within its scope the sacramental use of cannabis by Rastafari. 41. Although the freedom to manifest one's religion or belief cannot be realised if there are legal restrictions preventing a person from performing actions dictated by his or her convictions, it should be noted that such a freedom does not in itself include a general right of the individual to act in accordance with his or her belief. While the right to hold religious beliefs should be absolute, the right to act on those beliefs should not. As such, the right to practice one's religion must yield to the interests of society in some circumstances. A parent's right to refuse medical treatment for a sick child, for instance, may be subordinate to the state's interest in protecting the health, safety, and welfare of its minor children. 42. In the present case, thus, the Commission upholds the Respondent State's restriction, which is general and happens to affect Rastafari incidentally (de facto), along the lines of the UN Human Rights Committee, which, in the case K. Singh Bhinder v. Canada, Communication No. 208/1986 upheld restrictions against the manner of manifestation of one's religious practice. That case concerned the dismissal of the Complainant from his post as maintenance electrician of the government-owned Canadian National Railway Company. He had insisted on wearing a turban (as per the edicts of his Sikh religion) instead of safety headgear at his work, which led to the termination of his labour contract. The UN Human Rights Committee held: If the requirement that a hard hat be worn is seen as a discrimination de facto against persons of the Sikh religion under Article 26 × All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status (of the ICCPR), then, applying the criteria now well established in the jurisprudence of the Committee, the legislation requiring that workers in federal employment be protected from injury and electric shock by wearing of hard hats is to be regarded as reasonable and directed towards objective purpose that are compatible with the ICCPR. 43. The African Commission considers that the restrictions in the two South African legislations on the use and possession of cannabis are similarly reasonable as they serve a general purpose and that the Charter's protection of freedom of religion is not absolute. The only legitimate limitations to the rights and freedoms contained in the African Charter are found Article 27.2; i.e. that the rights in the African Charter "shall be exercised with due regard to the rights of others, collective security, morality, and common interest". The limitation is inspired by well-established principle that all human and peoples' rights are subject to the general rule that no one has the right to > recognised elsewhere. And the reasons for possible limitations must be founded in a legitimate state interest and the evils of limitations of rights must be strictly proportionate with and absolutely necessary for the advantages, which are to be obtained. It is noted that the Respondent State's interest to do away with the use of cannabis and its abuse/trafficking stems from the fact that, and this is also admitted by the Complainant, cannabis is an undesirable dependence-producing substance. For all intents and purposes, this constitutes a legitimate limitation on the exercise of the right to freedom of religion within the spirit of Article 27.2 cum Article 8. 44. Besides, the limitations so visited upon the Complainant and his fellow Rastafari fall squarely under Article 2 of the African Charter which requires States to ensure equal protection of the law. As the 5