fairness, which are implicitly embodied in the right to a fair trial, require that the domestic courts should complete the review within a reasonable time, as a required in Article 7(1)(d) of the Charter. 109. In the present case, the Second Applicant alleges that he filed an application for review of the Court of Appeal’s decision on 19 April 2013. However, the Respondent State disputes this claim, and the case file does not contain any record of the Second Applicant having submitted such an application for review to the Court of Appeal. In his Reply to the Respondent State’s response, the Second Applicant simply reiterated his claim that he had lodged his application but he failed to provide any supporting evidence and did not provide an explanation for that. The burden of proof, however, remained with the Second Applicant, but he has not discharged. 110. Consequently, the Court dismisses the Second Applicant’s contention that the Respondent State delayed hearing his application for review in violation of Article 7(1)(d) of the Charter. v. Allegation that the conviction and sentence was based on unclear domestic law 111. The First Applicant contends that he was charged with and convicted of the offence of armed robbery in accordance with Section 285 and 286 of the Respondent State’s Penal Code as amended by Act 10/89 and 27/1991. He asserts that the said sections of the law do not define the offence of armed robbery and as such, his conviction and sentence violate Article 7(2) of the Charter and the corresponding provision, that is, Article 13(6)(c) of the Respondent State’s Constitution. 112. The Respondent State disputes the Applicant’s submission and asserts that Section 285 and 286 of the Penal Code describe the ingredients required for the offence of armed robbery. It further states that the sentence of thirty (30) years in prison for the offence is not heavier than the penalty in force at the time when the offence was committed. 29