50. Accordingly, the Court finds that the Applicants exhausted local remedies as envisaged under Article 56(5) of the Charter and Rule 50(2)(e) of the Rules. B. Objection based on the failure to file the Application within a reasonable time 51. With respect to the second Application, the Respondent State contends that that the Application is time-barred. It elaborates that the judgment of the Court of Appeal was rendered on 29 July 2013 whereas the Application was lodged in this Court on 26 May 2016, which is two (2) years and six (6) months after the judgment of the Court of Appeal was delivered. 52. The Respondent State concedes that Rule 50(2)(f) of the Rules does not prescribe, define or quantify a specific period for reasonable time. However, it asserts that the reasonable period indicated in the Charter for filing applications after exhaustion of local remedies should be set at six (6) months in line with international human rights jurisprudence. 53. In the present case, the Respondent State avers that the Applicant does not indicate any impediments which prevented him from lodging the Application within six (6) months. In support of its contention, the Respondent State cites the decision of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights in Michael Majuru v. Zimbabwe (Communication 308/05), which set reasonable time at six (6) months. The Respondent State concludes that the delay in filing the Application for more than two (2) years after the delivery of the Court of Appeal’s judgment cannot be considered as a reasonable time. 54. Both the first and second Applicants contend that the objection is unfounded and assert that the period between the judgment of the Court of Appeal and when the Applications were filed is a reasonable time. 15