though the Court cannot assess the adequacy of the services provided by the “right” and the above-mentioned educational benefits, it notes that it is able to consider whether, in this regard, Mr. García Lucero had access to remedies that made it possible for him to file any claims he considered relevant. Thus, it is possible to evaluate, independently of the assessment of the above-mentioned fact that gave rise to the harm, whether, after August 21, 1990, the State incurred in acts or omissions that made it impossible to file appropriate and adequate actions to make the said claims. It is in this limited aspect that, in the instant case, the Court may consider whether the State’s international responsibility has arisen in relation to the possibility of filing claims for measures of reparation, independently of the fact that generated the original harm. 198. Based on the above, the Court finds it admissible to examine whether the State, with regard to the possibilities of claims relating to measures of compensation and rehabilitation, observed the rights to judicial guarantees and protection. D.2.2.2) The possibilities of filing claims in relation to measures of reparation 199. The proven facts do not show that, after August 21, 1993, Mr. García Lucero attempted, either himself or through his representatives, to file any action to obtain “integral reparation” or to claim the lack of access to measures of reparation established in Law No. 19,992 because he lives outside of Chile. Neither do they reveal that the fact that Mr. García Lucero resides in the United Kingdom means, in this case, that it was impossible to file legal actions in his country of origin. 208 The Court notes that Mr. García Lucero was in Chile in 1993 to take steps to obtain his pension as “a person dismissed for political reasons,” 209 which he obtained in 2000 and which he received retroactively to September 1998, so that, even though he lives in the United Kingdom, Mr. García Lucero was able to accede to administrative reparations. In addition, he has visited the country on other occasions, 210 he and his family members have been receiving legal advice since 1994 (supra para. 170) and, through his representatives, they have obtained legal counsel from different Chilean and international civil society organizations. 211 200. The Court has determined, since its first decision, that a remedy is formally adequate when it is “suitable” within the “domestic legal system” “to protect the legal situation violated.” 212 Regarding the reparation for victims of torture, the adequate remedies that the State must provide should make it possible to claim and have access to measures that include compensation and rehabilitation. 213 208 Thus, Mr. García Lucero argued, during the public hearing, supra, that he “would have to be” in Chile in order to file a complaint and have the means to pay lawyers. 209 Mr. García Lucero declared that he had received help from a senator to take the steps leading to obtaining his pension. 210 Cf. Statement of Leopoldo García Lucero during the public hearing before the Court, supra. 211 Cf. E-mail of Viviana Krsticevic addressed to Fiona McKay dated November 10, 1995, in which CEJIL stated “[…] we have reached the conclusion that no domestic remedy exists for this case […]” (merits file, brief with final arguments of the representatives, annex I, fs. 1284), and Letter of José Zalaquett to William Dishington dated September 28, 1994, in which the former indicated that, “[i]n theory, the victims of torture have the possibility of requesting that the perpetrators be declared criminally responsible and that the perpetrators and the State be declared civilly responsible if the perpetrators were State agents […]; in theory, the option to litigate is open; the possibilities of success are very remote” (merits file, brief with final arguments of the representatives, annex II, fs.1286 and 1287). 212 Cf. Case of Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras. Merits, supra, paras. 64 and 66; and Case of Castillo Petruzzi et al. Preliminary objections. Judgment of September 4, 1998. Series C No. 41, para. 63. 213 In this regard, it should be noted that the Court, in its case law, has always found it pertinent to establish measures of rehabilitation for surviving victims of torture. In some of these cases, it has considered it appropriate 65