State responsibility a party to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights), so that if the conduct was attributable only to Liechtenstein no breach of the Convention could have occurred. The Commission held the case admissible, on the basis that under the treaty governing the relations between Switzerland and Liechtenstein of 1923, Switzerland exercised its own customs and immigration jurisdiction in Liechtenstein, albeit with the latter’s consent and in their mutual interest. The officers in question were governed exclusively by Swiss law and were considered to be exercising the public authority of Switzerland. In that sense, they were not “placed at the disposal” of the receiving State.135 (8) A further, long-standing example of a situation to which article 6 applies is the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, which has acted as the final court of appeal for a number of independent States within the Commonwealth. Decisions of the Privy Council on appeal from an independent Commonwealth State will be attributable to that State and not to the United Kingdom. The Privy Council’s role is paralleled by certain final courts of appeal acting pursuant to treaty arrangements.136 There are many examples of judges seconded by one State to another for a time: in their capacity as judges of the receiving State, their decisions are not attributable to the sending State, even if it continues to pay their salaries. (9) Similar questions could also arise in the case of organs of international organizations placed at the disposal of a State and exercising elements of that State’s governmental authority. This is even more exceptional than the inter-State cases to which article 6 is limited. It also raises difficult questions of the relations between States and international organizations, questions which fall outside the scope of these articles. Article 57 accordingly excludes from the ambit of the articles all questions of the responsibility of international organizations or of a State for the acts of an international organization. By the same token, article 6 does not concern those cases where, for example, accused persons are transferred by a State to an international institution pursuant to treaty.137 In cooperating with international institutions in such a case, the State concerned does not assume responsibility for their subsequent conduct. Article 7. Excess of authority or contravention of instructions The conduct of an organ of a State or of a person or entity empowered to exercise elements of the governmental authority shall be considered an act of the 135 See also Drozd and Janousek v. France and Spain, Eur. Court H.R., Series A, No. 240 (1992), paras. 96 and 110. See also Controller and Auditor-General v. Davison (New Zealand, Court of Appeal), ILR, vol. 104 (1996), p. 526, at pp. 536–537 (Cooke, P.) and pp. 574–576 (Richardson, J.). An appeal to the Privy Council on other grounds was dismissed, Brannigan v. Davison, ibid., vol. 108, p. 622. 136 For example, Agreement relating to Appeals to the High Court of Australia from the Supreme Court of Nauru (Nauru, 6 September 1976) (United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1216, No. 19617, p. 151). 137 See, e.g., article 89 of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 45 State under international law if the organ, person or entity acts in that capacity, even if it exceeds its authority or contravenes instructions. Commentary (1) Article 7 deals with the important question of unauthorized or ultra vires acts of State organs or entities. It makes it clear that the conduct of a State organ or an entity empowered to exercise elements of the governmental authority, acting in its official capacity, is attributable to the State even if the organ or entity acted in excess of authority or contrary to instructions. (2) The State cannot take refuge behind the notion that, according to the provisions of its internal law or to instructions which may have been given to its organs or agents, their actions or omissions ought not to have occurred or ought to have taken a different form. This is so even where the organ or entity in question has overtly committed unlawful acts under the cover of its official status or has manifestly exceeded its competence. It is so even if other organs of the State have disowned the conduct in question.138 Any other rule would contradict the basic principle stated in article 3, since otherwise a State could rely on its internal law in order to argue that conduct, in fact carried out by its organs, was not attributable to it. (3) The rule evolved in response to the need for clarity and security in international relations. Despite early equivocal statements in diplomatic practice and by arbitral tribunals,139 State practice came to support the proposition, articulated by the British Government in response to an Italian request, that “all Governments should always be held responsible for all acts committed by their agents by virtue of their official capacity”.140 As the Spanish Government pointed out: “If this were not the case, one would end by authorizing abuse, for in most cases there would be no practical way of proving that the agent had or had not acted on orders received.”141 At this time the United States supported “a rule of international law that sovereigns are not liable, in diplomatic procedure, for damages to a foreigner when arising from the misconduct of agents acting out of the range not only of their real but 138 See, e.g., the “Star and Herald” controversy, Moore, Digest, vol. VI, p. 775. 139 In a number of early cases, international responsibility was attributed to the State for the conduct of officials without making it clear whether the officials had exceeded their authority: see, e.g., the following cases: “Only Son”, Moore, History and Digest, vol. IV, pp. 3404–3405; “William Lee”, ibid., p. 3405; and Donoughho’s, ibid., vol. III, p. 3012. Where the question was expressly examined, tribunals did not consistently apply any single principle: see, e.g., the Lewis’s case, ibid., p. 3019; the Gadino case, UNRIAA, vol. XV (Sales No. 66.V.3), p. 414 (1901); the Lacaze case, Lapradelle-Politis, vol. II, p. 290, at pp. 297–298; and the“William Yeaton” case, Moore, History and Digest, vol. III, p. 2944, at p. 2946. 140 For the opinions of the British and Spanish Governments given in 1898 at the request of Italy in respect of a dispute with Peru, see Archivio del Ministero degli Affari esteri italiano, serie politica P, No. 43. 141 Note verbale by Duke Almodóvar del Río, 4 July 1898, ibid.