A/HRC/22/44 broadly to include elements of inappropriateness, injustice, lack of predictability and due process of law”.29 62. The Human Rights Committee has stated that “in order to avoid a characterization of arbitrariness, detention should not continue beyond the period for which the State party can provide appropriate justification”.30 The legal basis justifying the detention must be accessible, understandable, non-retroactive and applied in a consistent and predictable way to everyone equally. Moreover, according to the Human Rights Committee, an essential safeguard against arbitrary arrest and detention is the “reasonableness” of the suspicion on which an arrest must be based. According to the European Court of Human Rights, “having a ‘reasonable suspicion’ presupposes the existence of facts or information which would satisfy an objective observer that the person concerned may have committed the offence. What may be regarded as ‘reasonable’ will however depend upon all the circumstances”.31 63. The notion of “arbitrary detention” lato sensu can arise from the law itself or from the particular conduct of Government officials. A detention, even if it is authorized by law, may still be considered arbitrary if it is premised upon an arbitrary piece of legislation or is inherently unjust, relying for instance on discriminatory grounds.32 An overly broad statute authorizing automatic and indefinite detention without any standards or review is by implication arbitrary. 64. Legislation allowing military recruitment by means of arrest and detention by the armed forces or repeated imprisonment of conscientious objectors to military service may be deemed arbitrary if no guarantee of judicial oversight is available. The Working Group has on occasion found the detention of conscientious objectors in violation of, inter alia, article 9 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and articles 9 and 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.33 65. Legal provisions incompatible with fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed under international human rights law would also give rise to qualification of detention as arbitrary.34 In this regard, national courts have drawn upon notions of arbitrariness as applied by the Human Rights Committee.35 66. The Working Group observes that the notion of promptness as set out in article 9, paragraph 3, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights is one key element that might render detention arbitrary. The Human Rights Committee has consistently found violations of article 9, paragraph 3, of the Covenant in cases of delays of a “few days” 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 22 As noted by the Human Rights Committee in Mukong v. Cameroon, communication No. 458/1991, Views adopted on 21 July 1994, para. 9.8. Human Rights Committee, Madani v. Algeria, communication No. 1172/2003, Views adopted on 28 March 2007, para. 8.4. European Court of Human Rights, Fox, Campbell and Hartley v. The United Kingdom (application No. 12244/86, 12245/86, 12383/86), Judgement, para. 32. See category V of the arbitrary detention categories referred to by the Working Group when considering cases submitted to it. See, for example, Working Group, opinions No. 8/2008 (Colombia) and 16/2008 (Turkey); see also, Human Rights Committee, Yoon and Choi v. Republic of Korea, communications Nos. 1321/2004 1322/2004, Views adopted on 3 November 2006. See, for example, Working Group, opinions No. 25/2012 (Rwanda) and No. 24/2011 (Viet Nam). Submission from the Government of Australia: in Blundell v. Sentence Administration Board of the Australian Capital Territory, Judge Refshauge drew upon notions of arbitrariness as applied by the Human Rights Committee in A. v. Australia. Judge Refshauge identified disproportionality, capriciousness and lack of comprehensive reasons as the hallmarks of arbitrariness. GE.12-18935