2015, the Applicant filed four (4) habeas lawfulness of his detention. The Court also penalized for attempting these remedies and held in conclusion that the period cited above corpus applications to challenge the noted that the Applicant could not be that, besides, he was under detention. It was reasonable. 5. This reasoning on the part of the Court runs counter to the very logic of the exception made by the legislator as to the second prerogative conferred on the Court to set a date as being the commencement of the time limit within which it shall be seized with a matter. 6.Indeed, whereas with regard to local remedies, the Court has held that Applicants are obliged to exercise only ordinary remedies, there would be no contradiction with this position had the Court, based on the fact that the Applicant filed for extraordinary remedies or “habeas corpus’ as in the present case, retained the date of these remedies as being the commencement of the time limit within which it shall be seized with the matter, instead of determining the reasonable period relying on these remedies as facts. 7. The Court should have justified this option in the following manner: "Notwithstanding the fact that it has considered that local remedies have been as evidenced by the Court of Appeal Judgment of 04/06/2012, the Court, in fairness and justice, would take as element of assessment, the date on which corpus application was filed, that is 2015”, which would have given a more time as it is shorter. exhausted the spirit of the habeas reasonable 8. By ignoring the aforesaid date and simply citing additional elements such as the Applicant's detention to justify reasonable time?, the Court failed to correctly apply Rule 40(6) of the Rules. ae Bensaoula Chafika Judge at the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights — 2 Paragraph 67 of the Judgment