mainly race, ethnicity, colour, sex, language, religion, political opinion or any other status. Recognising in Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights & Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa (on behalf of Andrew Barclay Meldrum) v Zimbabwe, the Commission defined discrimination as: II any act aimed at a distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference on the grounds of race, colour [...J or any other status and which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms ".49 135. As a result, in order to prove that there has been discrimination within the meaning of the Charter, it must be shown that the differentiation concerned the elements listed in Article 2 of the African Charter. In particular, as the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights stated in Isiaga v. Tanzania, the right to nondiscrimination strictly prohibits differential treatment between persons in similar circumstances on the basis of one or more of the grounds listed in Article 2 of the African Charters" . It follows that, in the specific context of the discrimination described by the Maputo Protocol in its Article 2, differential treatment must be based on the sole ground of sex. In particular, the equality of women and men must be clearly guaranteed by law. 136. In this case, the Complainants point out that the patriarchal system and adherence to cultural practices subject women to daily discriminatory practices. They list a ser~es of other facto:rs that tlie}':'claim exacerbate maternal health in Nigeria. The Complainants do not show the kind of discriminatory treatment the victims have been subjected to in relation to the grounds indicated in Article 2 of the African Charter. In particular, in analysing their arguments and the evidence supporting their allegations, the Committee notes that the Complainants have not demonstrated how the patriarchal system and cultural practices have caused differential treatment of the victims compared to the treatment accorded to other similar categories in the san1e'sifu~tion as the victims. 137. The Complainants' argument that financial barriers prevent poor women from accessing antenatal and intrapartum care in Nigeria and thus make it clear that they are being discriminated against is not sufficient to find a violation of Article 2 of the African Charter or Article 2 of the Maputo Protocol. Indeed, in order to conclude that there is discrimination, the act of differentiation must be aimed at a distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference of some kind that has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all right _,'-;00 ' s. In the present case, this objective is not apparent. Indeed, while f(j t!B;~ aternity services exist, it is not established that they were /1 0 articular objective of . access b y a certam. catego J~t, preventmg o i~~ I(~ 'at 138. As for the Complainants' allegatio tl) spouses of pregnant women would dis .~ " 49 Communication 50 Application donation by the omen who do not have 29/04.~ ZI:HR & IHRDA vi Zimbabwe (2006) ACHPR, para. 91. 032/2015, Kijiji Isiaga v United Republic of Tanzania (2018) AfCHPR para. 88, 26