17. The Respondent State further contends that Article 3 of the Protocol does not empower the Court to exercise appellate jurisdiction and to hear matters, review the judgments of the Court of Appeal, assess the evidence, quash the conviction and sentence, and release the Applicant. * 18. In his Reply, the Applicant submits that his application is predicated primarily on the fact that he was wrongly convicted and sentenced to thirty (30) years’ imprisonment, and that the judicial hierarchy of the Respondent State, therefore, wrongfully and unlawfully deprived him of his rights. 19. He further contends that for the above-mentioned reasons, and given that the Respondent State in the present case is a State Party to the Charter, the Court has jurisdiction to examine the Application. Furthermore, he submits that insofar as the Application raises substantive human rights issues under the Charter, the Respondent State is bound to respect and protect those rights. *** 20. The Court recalls that under Article 3(1) of the Protocol its jurisdiction extends to “all cases and disputes submitted to it concerning the interpretation and application of the Charter, the Protocol and any other relevant human rights instrument ratified by the States concerned.” 21. The Court underscores that, for it to assume material jurisdiction, it is sufficient that the Applicant alleges violations of human rights protected by the Charter or by any other human rights instrument ratified by the Respondent State.4 In the present case, the Applicant alleges violations of Articles 3(1)(2) and 7(1)(c) of the Charter. 4 Diocles William v. United Republic of Tanzania (merits and reparations) (21 September 2018) 2 AfCLR, 426, § 28; Armand Guéhi v United Republic of Tanzania (merits and reparations) (7 December 2018) 2 AfCLR 477, § 33; Kalebi Elisamehe v. United Republic of Tanzania (merits and reparations) (26 June 2020) 4 AfCLR 265, § 18. 6