8 KONSTAS v. GREECE JUDGMENT §§ 41-42, ECHR 2000-X). This is because the presumption of innocence, as a procedural right, serves mainly to guarantee the rights of the defence and at the same time helps to preserve the honour and dignity of the accused. 33. In this regard, the Court stresses the importance of the wording used by representatives of the State in remarks made before a person has been tried and found guilty of an offence. It considers that what counts when it comes to the application of the above-mentioned provision of the Convention is the real meaning of the remarks made, not their literal form (Lavents v. Latvia, no. 58442/00, § 126, 28 November 2002). However, whether or not a public official’s remarks breach the principle of the presumption of innocence must be examined in the context of the particular circumstances in which the offending remarks were made (see, among other authorities, Adolf v. Austria, 26 March 1982, §§ 36-41, Series A no. 49). ii. Application of the above principles to the present case (α) The fact that the remarks were made after the applicant had been convicted at first instance 34. The Court notes first of all that the offending remarks were made after the applicant had been convicted at first instance and while his appeal was still pending. The question thus arises whether the principle of the presumption of innocence could have been prejudiced at that stage of the proceedings. The Court considers that Article 6 § 2 of the Convention by no means prevented the competent authorities from referring to the applicant’s existing conviction when the matter of his guilt had not been finally determined. Clearly, the applicant’s conviction at first instance is the objective element at the centre of the appeal proceedings. Furthermore, regard being had to Article 10 of the Convention, Article 6 § 2 can neither prevent the authorities from informing the public about the criminal conviction concerned, nor prevent discussion of the subject by the media or the general public or, as in the present case, in the course of a parliamentary debate (see, mutatis mutandis, Allenet de Ribemont, cited above, § 38, and Papon v. France (no. 2) (dec.), no. 54210/00, ECHR 2001-XII). Nonetheless, such reference should be made with all the discretion and restraint which respect for the presumption of innocence demands (see Peša v. Croatia, no. 40523/08, § 139, 8 April 2010). 35. In addition, the Court reiterates that it has already found that in the preliminary stages of a criminal case statements made by the public authorities should not encourage the public to believe the accused guilty, or prejudge the assessment of the facts by the competent judicial authority (see Allenet de Ribemont, cited above, § 41). Furthermore, in other cases where the domestic courts had not determined the question of guilt by a final judgment, the European Commission on Human Rights has explained that it is the essence of the principle of presumption of innocence that it can only be invalidated by a final conviction in accordance with the law (see Englert