KONSTAS v. GREECE JUDGMENT 7 Court reiterates that the principle of the presumption of innocence is above all a procedural safeguard, and one of the elements of a fair criminal trial required by Article 6 de the Convention (see, in this regard, Arrigo and Vella v. Malta (dec.), no. 6569/04, 10 May 2005, and, more generally, Allenet de Ribemont v. France, 10 February 1995, § 35, Series A no. 308). As it has already stated, this principle is a specific application of the general principle stated in paragraph 1 of that Article (see Deweer v. Belgium, 27 February 1980, § 56, Series A no. 35). The Court notes that in the present case the Government did not refer to any remedy that would have enabled the applicant to invite the criminal court concerned to find a violation of the presumption innocence from the procedural standpoint. That being so, the claim for damages based on Article 57 of the Civil Code to which the Government referred could only be related to the alleged violation and sufficient in part; it could not fully remedy the alleged infringement of the presumption of innocence. The Court accordingly dismisses the Government’s preliminary objection. 30. The Court further notes that in the first part of his complaint under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention the applicant complained that the principle of the presumption of innocence was undermined by decision no. 1969/2005 of the Indictment Division of the Athens Court of Appeal. The Court observes, however, that that decision was given on 7 September 2005, more than six months before 25 November 2007, the date on which the present application was lodged. It follows that this part of the complaint under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention is out of time and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 1 and 4 of the Convention. 31. Lastly, as regards the second part of the applicant’s complaint under Article 6 § 2 of the Convention, concerning the remarks made by the Prime Minister, the Minister of Justice and the Deputy Minister of Finance, the Court notes that it is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention and that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible. b) Merits i. General principles 32. The Court reiterates that while the presumption of innocence enshrined in paragraph 2 of Article 6 is one of the elements of the fair criminal trial that is required by Article 6 § 1, it is not limited to a procedural safeguard in criminal matters: its scope is broader and requires that no representative of the State should say that a person is guilty of an offence before his guilt has been established by a court (see Allenet de Ribemont, cited above, §§ 35-36). The Court also points out that the presumption of innocence may be infringed not only by a judge or court but also by other public authorities (see Daktaras v. Lithuania, no. 42095/98,