22 GIULIANI AND GAGGIO v. ITALY JUDGMENT aim of intimidating the jeep's assailants, in which case the charge should be one of causing death by negligence (omicidio colposo); (b) that M.P. had fired without aiming at anyone or anything, with the aim of halting the attack, in which case the charge should be one of intentional homicide on account of “reckless conduct”, as he had accepted the risk that demonstrators might be hit. 94. The investigating judge took the view that the first hypothesis advanced by the public prosecutor was not correct. If M.P. had fired as high in the air as possible his actions would not have been punishable, by virtue of Article 53 of the Criminal Code (“the CC”), and the causal link would in any case have been severed by an unforeseeable factor beyond his control, namely the bullet's collision with an intermediate object. 95. If, on the other hand, the second hypothesis advanced by the prosecuting authorities was accepted, it had to be established whether any grounds of justification existed (the legitimate use of weapons and/or self-defence, under Articles 53 and 52 of the CC – see paragraphs 142-144 below) which would exempt M.P. from criminal responsibility and make his actions not punishable. 5. Whether M.P. made legitimate use of his weapon (Article 53 of the CC) 96. The investigating judge first addressed the question whether the use of a weapon had been necessary. Under Article 53 of the CC (see paragraph 143 below), State agents had wider powers than ordinary individuals in the context of self-defence; this ground of justification was not subject to the condition that the reaction was proportionate to the threat, but to the condition of “necessity”. Even for State agents, the use of a weapon was a measure of last resort (extrema ratio); however, State agents could not be held responsible for the occurrence of a more serious event than that foreseen by them, as this risk was inherent in the use of firearms. In general terms, Article 53 of the CC permitted the use of force where it was necessary to repel violence or thwart an attempt to resist official authority. 97. M.P. had found himself in a situation of extreme violence designed to disturb public order and targeting the carabinieri, whose safety was directly threatened. In that connection the investigating judge cited extracts from the testimonies of two of the jeep's assailants (Mr Predonzani and Mr Monai), noting once again the violence of the assault, and referred to the photographs in the file. The victim's conduct had not been an isolated act of aggression, but one phase in a violent attack on the jeep by several persons, who had been tilting it sideways and probably trying to open the rear door. 98. The evidence in the file ruled out the possibility that M.P. had deliberately targeted Carlo Giuliani; however, even assuming that this had been the case, in the particular circumstances of the case his conduct would