005066 57.The Respondent State, referring to the Court's jurisprudence’, Applicant cannot rely on the exception provided contends that the under Article 56(5) of the Charter because he neglected to pursue domestic remedies. 58. The Applicant states that the procedure for seeking redress for human rights violations provided under Article 33 of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana is discretionary and accordingly, there is no need for him to exhaust this remedy. 59. The Applicant also states that Article 33(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana provides that a person aggrieved by the decision of the High Court may appeal to the Court of Appeal and further appeal to the Supreme Court. He contends that it is inconceivable that the High Court or Court of Appeal would reverse a decision of the Review Bench of the Supreme Court, noting that in any case, the Supreme Court would have the final say on appeals from those subordinate courts, in this case, to determine whether it violated the Applicant's rights. 60. The Applicant further avers that his rights guaranteed under Articles 2, 3 and 7 of the Charter have been violated by the Supreme Coun, the highest and final appellate court of the Respondent State and therefore he has exhausted local remedies. 61. In light of the above, the Applicant argues that the procedure under Article 33(1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Ghana is not capable of addressing his complaint. According to him, this is because the procedure envisaged therein is ineffective due to the constitutional impediment posed in challenging a decision of the Supreme Court, (the highest court) at the High Court. He cites Dawda Jawara v. The Gambia’? to buttress this point. kak '2 Application No.003/2012. Ruling of 28/03/2014 (Admissibility), Peter Joseph Chacha v. United Republic of Tanzania (hereinafter referred to as “Peter Joseph Chacha v. Tanzania Judgment (admissibility)”), § 142. '3 Dawda Jawara v. The Gambia (2000) AHRLR 107 (ACHPR 2000). 17 fer | EE