“Under the Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights, the concept of property is very broadly defined by reference to all the proprietary interests of an individual. It covers a range of economic interests: “movable or immovable property, tangible and intangible interests, such as shares, patents, an arbitration award, the entitlement to a pension, a landlord’s entitlement to rent, the economic interests connected with the running of a business and the right to exercise a profession...” (Protocol I of the ECHR is pari material with Article 14 of the ACHPR) In further support of the above opinion the ECHR has held in the case of BÉLÁNÉ NAGY v. HUNGARY (Application no.53080/13) JUDGMENT STRASBOURG 10 February 2015 @ 36 that: “Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 places no restriction on the Contracting State’s freedom to decide whether or not to have in place any form of social security scheme, or to choose the type or amount of benefits to provide under any such scheme. If, however, a Contracting State has in force legislation providing for the payment as of right of a welfare benefit - whether conditional or not on the prior payment of contributions - that legislation must be regarded as generating a proprietary interest falling within the ambit of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 for persons satisfying its requirements” 58. The court notes that the combined reading of article 20 (a) of the 1986 Liberian Constitution and Article 14 of the ACHPR guarantees the right to property. Following from the analysis and the jurisprudence from different jurisdiction, the court reaffirms and holds that pension is property with attendant right to be protected in accordance with the law. While the court has held that pension is property to which a proprietary right can be claimed, it should however be noted that this right is not absolute as it can be derogated from in accordance with the law or when necessary in a democratic society. The Court, in its analysis of the instant case finds no specific provision of the law which entitles a denial of the Applicant’s pension and other entitlements. Even though the Respondent contended that based on the Applicant’s resignation as provided for in the Abuja Accord, he is precluded from claiming the rights under the Act, the Court has already ruled that the Abuja Accord which allows resignation before the end of the Applicant’s tenure does not constitute a bar to his entitlement. Additionally the Respondent has not justified the denial of the pension 24