the purpose of the Charter and international human rights conventions and has to be of general application.” 131. From the exposed above, it can be concluded that when a law does not define the parameters or elements of the crime that it typifies, it cannot pass the test of legality since, by its nature, it will be arbitrary. 132. The Applicant claims that the expression “gross offense” is vague and imprecise and allows arbitrary interpretation and application. 133. The Court admits that the expression “gross offense” on its own, may effectively be subject to varied interpretation. 134. It is noted also that some other expressions contained in the provisions of the aforementioned Section 24 are shown in a generic way (see expressions such as indecent; obscene; or menacing character; annoyance, inconvenience, insult, enmity, ill will or needless anxiety, mentioned in the cited law.) 135. However, considering the margin of appreciation enjoyed by the State in the definition and prohibition of certain conduct, which it qualifies as crimes in its national legislation, and also taking into account that the interpretation of the aforementioned provisions occurs within the scope of the current criminal legal system, the Court considers that the provisions in question provide adequate information to individuals to adapt their conduct accordingly. 136. Thus, the Court concludes that the aforementioned Section 24 of the “Cybercrime Act” meets the “Law” requirement stipulated in Article 9 (2) of the African Charter. 2. Legitimate Objectives 137. The Defendant State, in its defense, maintained that Section 24 of the “Cybercrime (Prohibition, Prevention, etc.) Act, 2015 is concerned with the rights of others in the exercise of the freedom of expression in order to reduce the excesses involved, since this right to freedom of expression and press is not absolute; it provides restrictions that are permitted by law with the objective of respecting the rights and reputation of others. 32