89. Indeed, Article 9(3) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that "Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or shall be released". 90. The Applicants alleged that their preventive detention is being prolonged excessively, thereby violating their rights as recognised by the aforementioned international instruments. 91. Given the difficulty in finding a quantitative criterion that could be used in all situations, neither the African Charter on Human Rights, nor the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights or any similar international instrument, such as the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms or the Inter-American Charter on Human Rights, do not define clearly, what is meant by reasonable time-limit during which to effect the trial of suspects in preventive detention. 92. Some Constitutions and domestic laws have been careful in establishing a maximum time-limit beyond which nobody can remain in custody. 93. International Courts, which are competent in applying the relevant international instruments on human rights consider that the reasonable time-limit to effect the trial of detainees must be determined on the merit of each case, given the specificity of procedure, its degree of complexity, and depending on the nature of the offence, of the difficulty in the investigation or the number of people involved. 94. In the instant case and given the alleged facts, the Applicants are suspected of having committed a crime of embezzlement or mismanagement of public funds, in a case where 23 persons were already involved. Five cabinet members have also been interrogated. 95. Considering the nature of the crime for which the Applicants are charged, the number and the level of responsibilities of those involved, and the complexity of investigations relating to offences which are of financial in nature, one cannot confirm that, the time that has elapsed, (seven months) between the beginning of their detention, and the date on which the Applicants brought their case before the Court, is enough to believe that their preventive detention is gone beyond a reasonable time-limit. 96. Agreed, in examining the question of the observance of reasonable time-limit, one must take into account the conscientiousness of the authorities in their way of expediting the proceedings of the case. But, concerning this aspect, the pleadings filed on the case, including those by the parties themselves, give the impression that the authorities made conscious efforts to conduct the trial without unjustified delay. 97. Indeed, the accused were detained in June 2008 and immediately after, investigative proceedings were begun, such as the conduct of a financial audit of the companies, as well as hearing of five members of the Government in August. The Court holds that there are no indications that may lead her to judge that the Defendant State is slow in conducting the trial of the Applicants within the said time-limit. 98. And that, however, it shall be up to the Defendant State to take appropriate steps to ensure that a reasonable time-limit is strictly adhered to, or where it is impossible to observe such a time-limit, the detainees may have to enjoy the rights as enshrined in Article 9 (3) of the above-cited Covenant. As regards violation of the rights of the pregnant woman and those of the infant 99. This last plea-in-law concerns the particular situation of Applicant OBODJI, who, according to the Application filed, was pregnant during her detention, and gave birth to a living child during the preventive detention, but the infant is not kept in the prison house. 100. It is obvious that the Applicant was pregnant and that during the preventive detention period, she gave birth to a child who did not however remain in prison in the company of his mother. 101. In the Application, it is claimed that the detention of the Applicant and the fact that she was kept in prison before and after child birth, violates the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child. 102. The Court acknowledges the important role played by these two instruments in the protection of the interests of a minor as well as those of a pregnant woman and of a mother of minors. 103. Such instruments, in as much as they make reference to detention and imprisonment, must be taken into consideration by the States in the administration of justice, the reform of prisons, the making of laws which define the regime of incarceration of persons in penitentiary establishments, and in the administration of penitentiary services. 104. In this regard, special attention must be accorded Article 30 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights [sic], which provides that: 12