Or the date chosen by the Court as the starting date for the commencement
of the period of its own referral. Although it has set the date on which the
period of its own referral, the date of the Declaration, begins to run, the Court
has taken into consideration facts occurring after that date (2010 and 2013)
"reminders
taken
to the various judicial authorities
into account
in assessing
...." as factors that could
the reasonableness
of the time
be
limit for
referral under Article 56(6)....
| am
of the view that this manner
of interpreting the above-mentioned
Article is
erroneous and does not meet the spirit of the text, since the Articles of the Charter and
the Rules clearly state the date chosen by the Court and not the facts....
In my opinion, by taking the date of the Court of Appeal's judgment and the
date of the filing of the declaration made by the Respondent State (29 March
2010) and by taking into account events occurring after that date, the Court
has departed from the very meaning of the Article, since by this approach, it
has not determined any date as the starting date for the commencement of
the time-limit for its own seizure and has, on the other hand, confused the
two choices afforded to it by the above-mentioned Articles...
It would have been more logical to consider, since the legislator recognizes
this option for the Court,
November
the date on the letters sent to the Chief Justice,
8, 2013, which would
have made
the time limit more
reasonable
since it would have been two (2) years.
Such
an approach
would
have
been
more
consistent with Article 56(6) of the
Charter, which clearly specifies this choice by using the conjunction "or" and not the
words “failing that".
2) The conclusion
in the same
paragraph made
by the Court in two separate
cases that were the subject of the Applicant's allegations
It is clear that, in its analysis of the facts, the Court distinguished between two cases
brought before it by the Applicant and that for each case it concluded.