Applicant ought to have filed his Application with the Court does not arise. The Court, therefore, holds that this Application fulfils the requirement in the first limb of Rule 40(6). 51.As for the second aspect of Rule 40(6), the Court recalls that the date from which an application can be filed against any State party is the date on which the particular State deposited the Declaration under Article 34(6) of the Protocol which for the Respondent State is 29 March 2010.3 In the present Application, however, the Court notes that the Applicant alleges continuing violation of his rights and the Court has found, for purposes of establishing temporal jurisdiction, that the alleged violations have a continuous character, since they are founded in a law adopted in 1977 which remains in force to date. 52.The Court reiterates that the essence of continuing violations is that they renew themselves every day as long as the State fails to take steps to remedy them."4 The result is that the violations alleged to have been perpetrated by article 41(7) of the Respondent State’s Constitution automatically renewed themselves for as long as they were not remedied. 53. The Court notes that in this case it took the Applicant eight (8) years and four (4) months to file his case from the time when the Respondent State deposited its Declaration. However, no local remedy was available for the Applicant to exhaust and the persistence themselves. of the violations meant that they automatically renewed Given this context, the Court holds that, on the facts of the present case, and within the meaning of the second limb of Rule 40(6), it could have been seized of the matter at any time for as long as the law causing the alleged violation remained in force. ‘*3Mohamed Abubakari v. United Republic of Tanzania (merits) (2016) 1 AfCLR 599 § 89. 14 Cf. Parrillo v. Italy [GC] No. 46470/11 ECHR 27 August 2015 §§ 109-112 and FAU and others v. The Gambia Suit No. ECW/CCJ/APP/36/15, Judgment No. ECW/CCJ/JUD/04/18, 13 February 2018. 15