recognised religions. On the contrary, the Respondent State affirms that it applies Islamic Sharia as a default legal regime. The Commission has had occasion to pronounce that “it is fundamentally unjust that religious laws should be applied against non-adherents of the religion.”42 180. Despite the non-recognition of the Bahá’í faith, the personal law based on it, and marriages contracted based on such law, the Respondent State still has a duty to ensure to Bahá’ís the enjoyment of the right to equal protection of their marriages under a law that is neutral of any religion. Equal protection of the law entails, in respect of marriage, that if marriages of adherents of recognised religions are documented officially and afforded legal processes for redressing issues that arise with respect to those marriages; similar protection must be accorded to Bahá’ís and other persons who do not subscribe to any recognised personal law. The State must for this purpose adopt and maintain a neutral civil law that provides for the formal recognition and documentation of such marriages. 181. It follows that the refusal to provide such a legal regime, while affording it to adherents of the recognised religions is discriminatory. This differential treatment is unreasonable in that it is possible to provide for neutral recognition and documentation of marriages of those that do not subscribe to the recognised personal laws. In this respect, the failure to provide for a neutral legal regime for the recognition and documentation of Bahá’í marriages, coupled with the refusal to document such marriages amounts to unlawful discrimination. The Respondent State also violates Article 2 as read together with Article 3 of the Charter in this respect. 182. It is trite that where there is a violation there must be, not just a remedy, but an effective remedy. A remedy is considered effective if it is capable of redressing the wrong suffered.43 Regarding the difficulties to obtain official identification documents, the court judgment and the ensuing amendment to the civil status law constitute partial remedy. Additionally, the complainants seek compensation. The State submits that the Complainants neither indicated this particular remedy during the admissibility stage of the Communication nor in fact sought it at domestic level. As such, it neither had the chance to address the propriety of such a claim during the admissibility stage, nor the initial opportunity at domestic level through its judicial processes. Communications 48/90, 50/91, 52/91, 89/93, Amnesty International, Comité Loosli Bachelard, Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, Association of Members of the Episcopal Conference of East Africa v Sudan (1999) ACHPR para. 73 43 Communication 275/03 - Article 19 v Eritrea (2007) ACHPR para. 46; Communication 146/96 – Jawara v The Gambia (2000) ACHPR; and Communication 307/05 – Chinhamo v Zimbabwe (2007) ACHPR. 42 38