excluded by its reservation. On these premises, the Commission will not also consider the refusal to indicate Bahá’í as part of the claim of discrimination. 176. Regarding the remaining grounds, it is clear that the Respondent State’s agencies initially used to refuse to issue Bahá’ís with IDs and similar document because they adhere to a religion that it does not recognise and could not be accepted in the computerised system of recording civil status data. The confiscation of the victims’ IDs and birth certificates was also because these documents either bore ‘Bahá’í” as their religion or did not have any information on the religion column. The same applies to the instruction not to accept birth certificates which bore Bahá’í as the religion of the bearer. These measures were exacted on Bahá’ís because of their religion, which the Respondent State does not recognise. 177. It is apparent that one’s religion is irrelevant for purposes of whether they should be issued with official identification documents. This is partly the reason the domestic courts and the ensuing amendment to the law were able to dispense with the requirement to indicate religion for one to be issued official documents. It follows that the refusal to issue, and the confiscation of the victims’ official documents simply because they adhere to the Bahá’í faith together with the legal provision which required without exception that religion must be indicated were unreasonable. These measures were also disproportionate in the circumstances. The measures also pursued no legitimate aim other than perpetrating the political stance of the Respondent State not to recognise Bahá’í as a religion. It was possible, as later developments demonstrated, to issue official documents without having to record ‘Bahá’í’ in official records. In these respects, the refusal to issue and the confiscation of Bahá’ís’ documents was discriminatory and in breach of the obligation to respect the Bahá’ís’ right to access and possess official documents, and therefore a violation of Article 2 as read together with Article 3 of the Charter 178. However, the Commission considers that this issue was redressed at the domestic level by the court’s decision followed by amendments to the relevant law which permits Bahá’ís to obtain official documents with the religion column left blank. Indeed it is no longer the case of the victims herein, or Bahá’ís in general that they can not obtain official identification document at all. The violation was accordingly remedied so far as concerned the law as applied by the initial computerised system of recording civil data. 179. Regarding the refusal to recognise and document the Bahá’ís’ marriages, it is important to highlight that the Respondent State does not indicate whether there is a law neutral of religious source to govern relations such as marriages for persons under its jurisdiction who do not adhere to any religion or religions other than those recognised, and therefore who do not identity with the personal law based on the 37