down their psychological resistance and force them to incriminate themselves or confess to certain illegal activities. The cruel treatment had an impact on the first statements rendered before the Public Prosecutor’s Office, as well as on the statement made on May 7, 1999. Consequently, the trial court decided to assess this matter and not to rule out the allegations presented by the victims. 176. Indeed, one of the arguments used by the trial judges in order not to exclude the evidence from the proceedings was based on the fact that “it is not sufficient for someone to allege that he has been physically or mentally abused for that person to be released, since in principle he must prove that such violence existed and that it was used as a means to extract a confession, which, at most, would invalidate the confession […].” 273 Similarly, the expert witness Coronado indicated that “if it is alleged that a confession was obtained under torture, and it is not proven during the trial that there was a torturer, the confession will stand.” 274 As stated previously, this Court reiterates that the burden of proof for such facts rests with the State (supra para. 136), and therefore it cannot be argued that the petitioner did not fully prove his complaint in order to rule it out. 177. For all the above reasons, the Court concludes that the domestic courts, which heard the case at all stages of the proceeding, should have completely excluded the statements rendered before the Public Prosecutor's Office and the confessions made on May 7, 1999, given that the existence of cruel and inhuman treatment disqualified the use of such evidence, according to the international standards previously mentioned. Therefore, the Court declares the violation of Article 8(3), in relation to Article 1(1) of the American Convention, to the detriment of Messrs. Cabrera and Montiel. 3. Presumption of innocence principle 178. The Commission did not allege a violation of this guarantee. The representatives argued that “[t]he manner in which the evidence was gathered and assessed […] shows that, from the outset, the criminal proceeding was intended to prove the guilt of the [victims].” They pointed out that the courts “fragmented the body of evidence, placing value only on those items of evidence which, although produced irregularly, were useful to prove [their] involvement […] in an unlawful act, and excluding those items of evidence that necessarily led to the conclusion that the evidence had been fabricated and the confessions obtained under torture.” Furthermore, the courts shifted the burden of proof to the victims and assumed that it was not the State’s duty “to confirm that [their] confessions were not coerced.” 179. For its part, the State pointed out that “even through [Messrs. Cabrera and Montiel] were arrested during the commission of a crime in flagrante and the detainees themselves confessed to have committed certain illicit acts,” the courts focused their efforts “on proving the existence of a criminal act and consequently, their criminal responsibility.” Also, the State “emphasize[d] that at no time was the defense was hindered […] and each one of the arguments and evidence furnished by the defense was subjected to legal assessment.” Moreover, “the burden of proof 273 Also, the Fifth District Court noted that “[a]lthough the accused indicated that when they were arrested, they were tortured […] it is no less true, regardless of what has been mentioned, that this alleged violence was not proven in the criminal proceeding […] to confirm the versions given in the extension of the preliminary statement, in defense of the accused, [several] items of evidence were furnished […], however, this evidence is not sufficient to change the judgment.” Cf. Judgment issued on August 28, 2000 by the Fifth District Court, supra note 75, page 11220 to 11223. 274 Cf. Expert opinion rendered by expert witness Fernando Coronado Franco at the public hearing in this case. 69