fell upon the [P]ublic [P]rosecutor’s Office, which had to fully prove the elements that constituted the crime, based on different items of evidence which, once furnished and correlated with each other, proved the criminal responsibility of Messrs. Montiel and Cabrera. 180. In the instant case, the judgment by the court of first instance established that “[t]he court weighed up the issues that were beneficial and prejudicial to them, the fact that their health was endangered, the tranquility, peace and public security, […] and it [was] determin[ed] that the level of guilt" of Messrs. Cabrera and Montiel “[was] minimal and [that] minimum penalties [should be] imposed on them, especially because it was not conclusively proven that […] they belong[ed] to an armed group.” 275 181. For its part, the judgment of August 21, 20002 indicated that the principle of innocence “[was] revalidated since all the evidence demonstrated [the] criminal responsibility for the perpetration of the crime [which] was […] consider[ed] proven, based on the evidence that turned out to be appropriate and sufficient for that purpose.” 276 In any case, the writ of execution prior to that judgment emphasized that “[the] Federal Court considered ineffective the evidence gathered by the Public Prosecutor’s Office during the preliminary inquiry in relation to the crimes of possessing a firearm without a permit and a crime against health in the form of cultivating marijuana.” 277 182. This Court has pointed out that the principle of presumption of innocence is the basis of a fair trial [judicial guarantees]. 278 The presumption of innocence implies that the defendant does not have to prove that he has not committed the offense of which he is accused, because the onus probandi rests with the prosecutor. 279 Thus, the convincing demonstration of guilt is an essential requirement for a criminal sanction, so that the burden of proof falls on the prosecutor and not on the accused. 280 183. The Court has also held, as stated in Article 8(2) of the Convention, that the principle of presumption of innocence means that a person cannot be convicted unless there is full proof of his criminal liability. If the evidence presented is incomplete or insufficient, he must be acquitted, not convicted. 281 Thus, the lack of full proof of a person’s criminal responsibility in a condemnatory judgment violates 275 Cf. Judgment issued on August 28, 2000 by the Fifth District Court, supra note 75, page 11276. 276 Cf. Judgment of August 21, 2002 issued by the First Single-Magistrate Tribunal, supra note 148, page 15301. 277 Cf. Judgment of August 14, 2002 issued by the Second Collegiate Tribunal, supra note 84, pages 14641 to 14642. 278 Cf. Case of Suárez Rosero v. Ecuador, supra note 234, para. 77; Case of García Asto and Ramírez Rojas v. Peru, supra note 102, para. 160; and Case of Chaparro Álvarez and Lapo Íñiguez v. Ecuador, supra note 99, para. 145. 279 Case of Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay. Merits, Reparations and Costs. Judgment of August 31, 2004. Series C N. 111, para. 154. 280 Likewise, the United Nations Human Rights Committee has indicated that “the presumption of innocence, which is fundamental to the protection of human rights, imposes on the prosecution the burden of proof, guarantees that no guilt can be presumed until the charge has been proved beyond reasonable doubt, ensures that the accused has the benefit of doubt, and requires that persons accused of a criminal act must be treated in accordance with this principle. It is a duty for all public authorities to refrain from prejudging the outcome of a trial, e.g. by abstaining from making public statements affirming the guilt of the accused.” United Nations. Human Rights Committee. General Comment N° 32, supra note 258, para. 30. 281 Cf. Case of Cantoral Benavides v. Peru, supra note 272, para. 120; Case of Ricardo Canese v. Paraguay, supra note 279, para. 153. 70