"State Parties to this Charter shall put in place, a special treatment for pregnant women and mothers of infants and minors who have been indicted or found guilty of a penal offence, and shall ensure particularly that: 1. A sentence other than jail term shall be given, in all cases, against pregnant women; 2. Measures aiming to replace the imprisonment of pregnant women shall be taken and promoted; 3. Specialised Institutions shall be established, wherein the detention of such mothers shall be carried out; 4. All measures shall be put in place to forbid the imprisonment of a mother and her child; 5. All measures shall be put in place to forbid that a death sentence be passed against such mothers; 6. The prison system shall essentially aim at reforming, reintegrating the mother into her family and rehabilitating her into the society." 105. However, the Court understands that the provisions cited above do not absolutely debar the States from detaining pregnant women and nursing mothers. It is true that it is the Charter itself which brings the States under the obligation of "creating special institutions for taking care of the detention of mothers". This confirms the fact that there is no absolute prohibition on deprivation of freedom in such an instance. 106. What the States are bound by, is that they are under an obligation to make a preference for alternative measures, as regards the imprisonment of pregnant women where this is possible, and to create special institutions for the detention of pregnant women and nursing mothers. 107. As emphasised by Habib Gherari in Etudes Internationales, vol.22, No 4, 1991, pp. 735- 751, with regard to the rights that are guaranteed by the African Charter, "In order for the African Child or the Child who is on the African continent to truly enjoy the generality of these rights, two conditions must be met. On the one hand, and in the majority of cases, the State must make adequate Regulations and necessary concrete Measures (Art 1(1) of the Charter); indeed, if civil rights and fundamental liberties have, as we all know, direct applicability, it is not the same for such rights that are highly social in nature, which, except for few, like Primary Education, which is free and obligatory in nature (Art 11.3a), require great and constant effort. And this is well emphasised in the Charter, their enforcement is highly dependent on the availability of resources." 108. In the instant case, there is no evidence that the Defendant State makes provision for conditions which enable her to accord greater attention to the non deprivation of the Applicant's freedom, or her incarceration in a special prison, without compromising, all the same, the rationale behind the preventive detention. 109. Whatever the case may be, the infant did not remain in the company of his mother in the prison house. Besides, an arrangement for enabling visitors to come on visits, may minimise and attenuate the effects related to the separation of the mother from the child. Consequently 110. Whereas the publication of information by the media on the investigation and preventive detention of the Applicants do not constitute a violation of the principle of presumption of innocence, by the State of Côte d'Ivoire, such as to trample on the honour and reputation of the Applicants; 111. Whereas the preventive detention of the Applicants is not arbitrary, since it arose from a judicial procedure; 112 Whereas the circumstances of the instant case do not permit to adjudge that the time-limit for the conduct of the proceedings, by means of which the Applicants were detained, is unreasonable; 113. Whereas the detention of the Applicant OBODJI, nee HOUSSOU Amelan Roselyne, does not constitute a violation by the State of Côte d'Ivoire, of her rights as a pregnant woman and the rights of her 13