and not exercised by other human rights monitoring bodies and as such undermine the legitimacy of the African system on the protection of human rights. 68. The Respondent State concludes its arguments by praying that the African Commission finds the Communication inadmissible based on the following reasons: Analysis on Admissibility 1. the Communication concerns events which took place at a time when the Charter was inapplicable to the Republic of South Africa; 2. the Communication does not set out a prima facie violation and is manifestly unfounded; 3. the Communication is not sufficiently substantiated; and 4. the Communication does not concern violation of human rights. 69. Article 56 of the African Charter provides seven requirements which must all be met before a Communication can be declared admissible by the African Commission. 70. The Complainants submit that it has fulfilled all the requirements in Article 56 of the African Charter. The Respondent State on the other hand contends that the Complainants have not fulfilled some requirements of Article 56 and as such, this Communication should be declared inadmissible. The Commission will thus proceed to analyse the arguments of both Parties based on the provisions of Article 56 of the Charter. 71. Article 56(1) of the Charter provides that "Communications relating to human and Peoples' Rights... shall be considered if they: indicate their authors even if the latter request anonymity". In this Communication, the author and those he is representing are clearly stated. The author is Tshifhiwa Samuel Makhale, the President of Dabalorivhuwa Patriotic Front (DPF) and the Dabalorivhuwa Patriotic Front (DPF). The Commission also has details of their contact address and other relevant information. For this reason, the Commission holds that this requirement has been duly complied with. 72. Article 56 (2) of the Charter provides that "Communications relating to human and Peoples' Rights... shall be considered if they: are compatible with the Charter of the Organisation of African Unity or with the present Charter". The principle of compatibility with the African Charter presupposes that four elements must be satisfied to make a Communication compatible with the African Charter. First, the Communication must allege that a provision set out in the Charter has been violated (ratione materiae), second, the Communication must be directed at a State Party and must be brought by someone who is competent to do so (ratione personae), thirdly, the Communication must be based on events which occurred within the period of the Charter's application to the State (ratione temporis), except there is evidence of continuing violation9 and lastly, it must be within the territorial sphere within which the Charter operates (ratione loci). 73. The Respondent State submits that this Communication is not compatible with the Charter because it does not fall within the period of application of the Charter in the Republic of South Africa. The State in this instance argues that the Republic of South Africa deposited its instrument of accession to the African Charter in July 1996 and only became party to the Charter in October 1996, while the events complained of by the Complainant started in 1994, two years before South Africa became a party to the Charter. Therefore, the Respondent State argues, it cannot be held liable for events which took place before October 1996, especially when there is no evidence of a continuing violation. 74. It is a general principle of international law that treaties 'do not bind a party in relation to any act or fact which took place in any situation which ceased to exist before the date of the entry into force of the treaty in respect to that party',10 except where the treaty itself provides otherwise by expressly allowing retroactive effect, or where there are 'continuous violations'.11 The Republic of South Africa did not become a party to the Charter until 9 July 1996 (and the Charter entered into force three months later).12 In principle, a State cannot be held liable for events which occurred before the applicability of the Charter to it. The African Commission applied this principle in Njoka v Kenya.13 75. In Annette Pagnoulle v Cameroon14 however, the African Commission recognised an exception to the general principle and stated that when the consequences of an alleged violation 'constitute a continuing violation of any of the Articles of the African Charter, the Commission must pronounce on these.'15 The Commission has shown in this case that it has the competence to pronounce on violations which occurred prior to the Charter's application to the State Party in question, where there is evidence of continuing 7