× 115. The Court notes that the first sentence of Article 2 § 1 enjoins the State not only to refrain from the intentional and unlawful taking of life, but also to take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction (see the L.C.B. v. the United Kingdom judgment of 9 June 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-III, p. 1403, § 36). It is common ground that the State's obligation in this respect extends beyond its primary duty to secure the right to life by putting in place effective criminal-law provisions to deter the commission of offences against the person backed up by law-enforcement machinery for the prevention, suppression and sanctioning of breaches of such provisions. It is thus accepted by those appearing before the Court that Article 2 of the Convention may also imply in certain well-defined circumstances a positive obligation on the authorities to take preventive operational measures to protect an individual whose life is at risk from the criminal acts of another individual. The scope of this obligation is a matter of dispute between the parties. ). 16 Cf Cameroon Tribune No. 5231 dated 7 October 1992, page 16 17 Cf. <> in Cameroun Tribune No. 5246 du 26th October 1992. Page 4 18 Cf. Cameroun Tribune No. 5231 dated 7th October 1992 page 8. 19 See communication 211/98 Legal Resources Foundation vs. Zimbabwe. 20 See communications : No. 74/92 ; No. 137/94 ; No. 48/90 ; No. 50/91; No. 52/91; No. 89/93; [No. 137/94], No. 139/94; No. 154/96; No. 161/97; No. 147/95; No. 149/96; No. 155/96; No. 211/98; No.223/98, in which the African Commission has had to clarify the scope of Article 1 of the Charter. 21 communication 74/92, National Human Rights and Liberties Commission vs. Chad; communication 155/96, Social and Economic Rights Action Centre and the Centre for Economic and Social Rights vs. Nigeria. 22 communication 245/2002, Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum vs. Zimbabwe, parag. 143. 23 The distinction between these two types of obligations in international law has for the first time been established in explicit terms by D. Donatti who has made it a general principle (D. Donati I Trattati internazionali nel diritto costituzionale, Turin, Unione tipografico-editrice torinese, 1906, vol. I . p. 343 et suivant). It had already implicitly been done by H. Triepel where he highlighted the difference between domestic law immediately applicable and domestic law that is internationally pertinent (H. Triepel, Volkerrecht und Landesrecht, Leipzig Hirschfeld, 1899, p. 299) [édition française : Droit international et droit interne, tr. Par R. Brunet, Paris, Pedone, 1920, p. 297] 24 Aubert Jean-luc, Introduction to the Law and Fundamental Themes of Civil Law, Paris, Armand Colin, 1995 N°244 p.252 25 Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1977, Vol II, Part 2, page 12 onwards 26 Application No. 9024/80, ECHR (1985) Série A, vol. 89 27 Application No. No. 9186/80, Judgement of 1984 para 35 × The Court recalls that the Contracting States are under the obligation to organise their legal systems "so as to ensure compliance with the requirements of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1)" (see the Guincho judgment] of 10 July 1984, Series A no. 81, p. 16, [popup=para. 38]38. The Court recognises the value of the first argument. It cannot overlook that the restoration of democracy as from April 1974 led Portugal to carry out an overhaul of its judicial system in troubled circumstances which were without equivalent in most of the other European countries and which were rendered more difficult by the process of decolonisation as well as by the economic crisis (see paragraph 21 above). Nor does the Court in any way underestimate the efforts taken to improve the citizen's access to justice and the administration of the courts, in particular after the promulgation of the Constitution in 1976 (see paragraph 21 above). Nonetheless, the Court must on this issue concur with the views of the Commission and the applicant. In ratifying the Convention, Portugal guaranteed to "secure to everyone within [its] jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in Section I" (Article 1) (art. 1). In particular, Portugal undertook the obligation of organising its legal system so as to ensure compliance with the requirements of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1), including that of trial within a "reasonable time" (see the above-mentioned Zimmermann and Steiner judgment, Series A no. 66, p. 12, para. 29). The Court would once more draw attention to the extreme importance of this requirement for the proper administration of justice. ); impartiality is unquestionably one of the foremost of those requirements. The Court's task is to determine whether the Contracting States have achieved the result called for by the Convention, not to indicate the particular means to be utilised.[/popup] 28 ICJ, Judgement of 9 January 2009, General List no. 139 29 See para 44 18