77. The Commission is of the view that the established necessity by its jurisprudence of an indispensable guarantee of the right of appeal and second hearing is still more urgent in cases where international standards to which the State has an obligation exempt some categories of persons particularly children and pregnant women from the imposition or execution of these sentences. In the cases involving these categories of persons, it is necessary for them to be able to challenge the legality of such sentences when they are handed down by a national judicial organ which rules in first and last instance. 78. Furthermore, and from a more general perspective, the Commission notes that even if the Charter does not expressly provide for a right to remedy, such a right can be generated implicitly and automatically by the numerous rights protected by the Charter. It is obvious that an instrument cannot protect such a number of rights without providing a right to a remedy and appeal when established rights are violated. In the absence of the right to remedy and appeal, the other rights under the Charter would be sheer illusion and vain proclamations. The only requirement of exhaustion of existing, effective and satisfactory domestic remedies as a prerequisite for admissibility of the Complaints brought before the Commission is sufficient to convince oneself of the existence of a right to remedy and appeal in the Charter. 79. In this instance, the Commission has already concluded that the sentencing of minors to the capital punishment by a Military Court is a violation of their right to life guaranteed by Article 4 of the Charter in cross review with other international obligations binding the Democratic Republic of Congo. The Commission notes that the parties are in agreement on the right of appeal in this present Communication, and also on the fact that the decisions of the Military Court cannot be opposed nor appealed against. It is obvious that the victims did not have the opportunity to access an alternative remedy before the competent national courts whereas the provisions of Article 7(1)(a) of the Charter provide them such a right. 80. On this issue, the Respondent State reiterates the possibility of a presidential pardon. As indicated above, the Commission considers that this pardon cannot be viewed as a jurisdictional remedy as it depends on the goodwill of the President of the Republic. The Respondent State further submits that the Military Court was abolished by Law No. 023/2002 of 18 November 2002 and replaced by military jurisdictions that conform to the principle of second appeal. However, this abolition, from the perspective of the Commission, does not also make up for the past violations actually suffered by the victims. In the light of the foregoing, the Commission notes that the provisions of Article 7(1)(a) of the Charter were violated. 81. The Complainants also allege that the provisions of Article 7(1)(c) of the Charter have been violated as it specifies that any individual has the right to defence, including the right to be defended by counsel of his choice . The Commission recalls that the right to assistance by a counsel is fundamental to a transparent and fair trial. In its Directives on the Right to a Fair Trial , the Commission lays particular emphasis on the urgent need to guarantee the choice of counsel in cases where accused persons face capital punishment. 21 This need is one of the anchor points in the position taken in Purohit and Moore v. The Gambia where the Commission declared that, in circumstances where the decision has the potential of touching, among others, the life of persons concerned, the rights to be heard and to be represented become necessary. 22 . 82. However, such a representation before the court can be illusive in cases where the accused persons are not in a position to provide that. It is precisely under such circumstances that the mechanism of judicial assistance comes in at exactly the right time. The principle which underlines the mechanism of judicial assistance is that it is the responsibility of the State to provide a lawyer for the defense of persons who are incapable of paying for such services. In this regard, in its Directives on the right to a fair trial , the Commission places key emphasis on certain specific circumstances where judicial assistance is fundamental. The Directive H(c) which governs aid and judicial assistance prescribes that the interest of justice always 23 requires that the accused person facing capital punishment be represented by a lawyer . 83. The Complainants allege that during their trial before the Military Court, the victims did not receive judicial assistance from a counsel, and much less a counsel of their choice whereas the crimes for which they were being prosecuted were punishable by the death penalty. The Democratic Republic of Congo contests these facts, without providing any proof to the contrary. Additionally, the Respondent State does not provide any specific reference in respect of provisions on judicial assistance in its national legislation; neither does it provide any proof that the assistance is applicable before the Special Court which is the 13