72. On the pro deo system, the Commission notes that, if the system or the use of inexperienced young defence lawyers had been so fundamental to the trial of Mr. Ping, so as to cause a miscarriage of justice and a violation of his fair trial rights, such miscarriage of justice ought to have formed a ground of appeal in the Court of Appeal. However from the evidences before this Commission including the judgements of the High Court and that of the Court of Appeal of the Respondent State, the Complainants did not mention that due process was not respected with regards to the pro deo system in the trial of Mr. Ping, as a result of which his trial was negatively affected. The Commission further notes that the issue of pro deo representation never arose at the Court of Appeal. 73. The Commission further holds the view that it is responsibility of the Courts of State Parties and not that of the Commission to evaluate the facts in a particular case submitted before such Courts, and unless it is shown that the Courts’ evaluation of the facts are manifestly arbitrary or amounted to a denial of justice, the Commission cannot substitute the decision of the Courts with that of its own. It has not been shown that the Courts’ evaluation of the evidence put before them was in anyway arbitrary or erroneous, as to result in a failure of justice in Mr Ping’s case.28 74. The Commission finally holds the view that in the absence of the Respondent State’s submissions, it is the duty of the Complainant to lead copious and cogent evidence to support each and every allegation of fact contained in their complaint. Relying on mere suspicion, no matter how strong the suspicion may be, cannot constitute the grounds for the violation of Charter rights. To hold otherwise would amount to speculation. The Commission finds that it is also not 28 See Communication 240/01 at para 29 23 | P a g e