92. Based on the foregoing findings, we are of the view that a plain reading of the abovementioned provisions leads to the conclusion that the Public Prosecutor acted within the limits of the power vested in him by the relevant Burundian Laws when he initiated the prosecution of Mr. Rufyikiri for alleged acts of corruption. Consequently, we hold that the 1st Respondent cannot be faulted for violating Articles 6(d) and 7(2) of the Treaty. 93. Turning to the act of banning Mr. Rufyikiri from travelling outside the Burundian territory, the bone of contention appears to revolve around the authority competent to order a travel ban against a suspect. Counsel for the Applicant argued that such a ban should be issued by a court of law while Counsel for the 1st Respondent contended that the competent authority in that matter is the Public Prosecutor. 94. As it transpired from the material placed before the Court and in submissions during the hearing held on 11th February 2015, both parties relied on Article 10 of Law No/1/12 as reproduced above in support of their respective arguments on this issue. When asked by the Court which authority is referred to in this article, Counsel for the 1st Respondent replied that the Prosecutor General is the one competent to issue a travel ban and that no intervention of a court of law is required. 95. This averment was rebutted by Counsel for the Applicant by quoting the provisions of Articles 60 and 65, paragraph 6 of the Penal Code according to which such a competence is the prerogative of a Court of law. 96. We agree with Counsel for the Applicant’s reading of the two provisions that according to Burundi Laws, the prohibition from travelling outside the territory of Burundi is imposed by an order of the court. Accordingly, it is our view that procedural irregularities REFERENCE NO.1 OF 2014 Page 30