in Malawi African Association v. Mauritania that the limitations imposed within the context of the law must be in accordance with the obligations under the Charter. 12 The Commission goes much further, among others, in its decision in Amnesty International v. Zambia , to explain that such limitations must not be at variance with the Constitution of the State nor international standards. 13 68. With particular reference to the limitation of rights applied to the protection of the right to life in the spirit of the African Charter, the Commission is of the opinion that the approach to be adopted towards the effective protection of human rights must be an appropriate and objective one. Such an approach should be a liberal and pro-active one. In fact, in addition to establishing the inviolable 14 nature of the right to life in its Article 4 , the text of the African Charter does not make any reference to the death penalty unlike other international instruments such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). 69. It can be inferred that the Charter does not allow the death penalty to be imposed with the exception of the right to life, the inviolability of which is declared. The Commission however confirms it by taking a position in 240/2001 Interights and Others (on behalf of Bosch) v. Botswana , that even though the respect for the rights to a fair trial is guaranteed in the procedure leading to the imposition of the death penalty, nobody can in contemporary times overlook the purely abolitionist trend of the States towards this punishment. 15 The Commission, in its decision then, called on Botswana to take the necessary measures to comply with its Resolution requesting the Member States to consider suspending the death penalty. 16 Significantly, the Commission based its recommendation for the suspension of the death penalty, among others, on the universal trend towards abolition, reflected in the adoption of the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR and the constant increase in the number countries that had become de facto abolitionists. 70. Whatever one may say, the legality of the violation of the right to life through the imposition of the death penalty cannot be considered as an absolute restriction. These are evidenced by the specific exceptions provided for on this matter by international standards. It is on this point that the African Commission can make a real difference as enjoined in Article 60 of its Charter to draw inspiration from the other international human rights instruments. In the circumstances of the case, the Commission deems it appropriate to have recourse to this source of inspiration particularly with regard to the instruments for the protection of the rights of the child. 71. In order to carry out this, the Commission notes that many international obligations, to which the Democratic Republic of Congo has committed itself, prohibit the imposition of the death penalty on children. We cannot refer to this subject without mentioning the fundamental standard on this matter which is Article 6(5) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights expressed in the following terms, a death sentence cannot be imposed for crimes committed by individuals who are below 18 years . Even if it were to be assumed that the concept of arbitrariness would maintain an open window on the limitation of the right to life protected by Article 4 of the Charter, one actually realizes that the provisions of Article 6 of the Covenant × 1. Every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life. 2. In countries which have not abolished the death penalty, sentence of death may be imposed only for the most serious crimes in accordance with the law in force at the time of the commission of the crime and not contrary to the provisions of the present Covenant and to the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final judgement rendered by a competent court. 3. When deprivation of life constitutes the crime of genocide, it is understood that nothing in this article shall authorize any State Party to the present Covenant to derogate in any way from any obligation assumed under the provisions of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. 11