the lnternational Court of Justice could without hindrance to its jurisdiction, deal with the question of human rights. 28.1n this sense, it may be observed that an increasing number of international courts have specialized in human rights, without having an initial mandate to do so. On closer inspection, this is mainly due to lheu applicable law. The cross- cutting nature of the rules of international law has a clear impact on the deployment of jurisdiction. lt is thus understandable that in addition to the provisions framing the jurisdiction, the Protocol establishing the African Court has taken them over in terms of applicable law. 29.The same analysis can be made with regard to the European Court of Human Rights. ln the Nicolai SlivenkolT judgment of 2003, the Court stated that it should not "re-examine the facts established by the national authorities and having served as a basis for their legal assessment" by reviewing the "findings of the national courts as to the particular circumstances of the case or the legal characterization of those circumstances in domestic law", but at the same time recognized that it was part of its task "to review, from the Convention perspective, the reasoning underlying the decisions of the national courts". The doctrine derived from the idea that the Court was increasing the intensity of its review of judicial decisions. This can only be achieved through a broad reading of the law which the Court is mandated to apply. lt can thus be said that the applicable law and jurisdiction stand together, the latter is undoubtedly a common thread. Links established between Articles 3 and 7 in the second wave of Court decisions B 30. Where the Court finds a difficulty or possible challenge to its jurisdiction, it shall combine the two Articles 3(1) and 7. lt uses these two complementary texts. lt does not, however, feel bound to indicate explicitly the use thus made of Article 7 rr IiCllR. , and that is what we regret. .\'itttlui Slittnko v. Lotvitt. g Octobcr 2001 10