9. In general, however, it may be said that in granting such a time limit to the Respondent State, the Court’s main objective is to give the latter time to put the appropriate measures in place. 10. With regard to this objective, the extent of the time limit will certainly depend on the nature of the measures expected. If, for example, the time is intended for the Respondent State to initiate a legislative process or other similar process, it is obvious that the Respondent State will need a relatively long time to complete the process. If, on the other hand, it is simply a matter of refraining from doing something or of doing something easy, such as allowing the Applicant access to medical care or a lawyer or to receive visits from members of his family, then the Respondent State does not need much time to comply with the Court Order. 11. In the instant case, the Court did not order the Respondent State to urgently enact a law for retroactive abolition of the death penalty or to retry the Applicant, which would have required much time. All that the Court orders is for the Respondent State to temporarily suspend execution of the death sentence imposed on the Applicant by the domestic court, pending the Court’s decision on its jurisdiction, admissibility of the Application and on the merits of the case. 12. To ensure that the sixty (60) days' time limit granted meets the logic inherent in the urgency of the provisional measures, it was necessary to take into account the means which the Respondent State must deploy to stay execution of a person under death sentence who, besides, is "on the death row awaiting execution". 13. In this respect, it seems judicious to recall that, in this matter, the principle is that of immediate stay of execution and to the minute, and that no derogation is effective. By way of illustration, the European Court of Human Rights, in a Judgment issuing provisional measures, strongly reaffirmed that when life and health are at stake, even "diplomatic assurances" are ineffective and application of the provisional measure is immediate, urgent and to the minute5. and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. This penalty can only be carried out pursuant to a final judgement rendered by a competent court." 5 Othman v. United Kingdom ECHR, Fourth Section, 17 January 2012, No. 8139/09, (paragraphs 148, 151, 170 and 180). See also Marcellus S. Williams, Petitioner v. Cindy Griffith, Warden Supreme Court of the United States, decision suspending execution of the death penalty was followed with Immediate